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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
In recent years, the United Nations has been urged by several influential Member States to carry out 
its programs in high-risk environments. In light of the security challenges that these new 
circumstances have created, the UN has undergone a shift in its operations, bending the traditional 
concept of peacekeeping mission towards a more robust approach, involving the proactive use of 
force in defense of the mandate rather than the mere defensive posture. As part of these “hard 
measures”, the UN has increasingly expanded its relationship with the business sector. In the last 
decade, Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) provided a high number of services to 
UN missions around the globe, from the protection of personnel and buildings to escorting relief-
convoys, demining operations and personnel training. Today, the private military and security 
industry is increasingly involved in the core business of peacekeeping operations and is eager to 
further expand its contribution. One of the most recent proposals in this sense has been that the UN 
should evaluate the potential use of PMSCs to serve as UN Rapid-Reaction Force. This paper will 
examine this proposition by analysing the legal and regulatory framework governing PMSCs’ 
conduct when operating within the context of peacekeeping operations, by assessing and 
establishing the critical areas, and subsequently by identifying the decisions that the UN would have 
to take in order to ensure that the RRF operates under the highest possible standards. After having 
outlined the path that brought to the current transnational private security industry, this paper 
examines the evolution of UN Peacekeeping operations and the role that PMSCs have played along 
this way. The second part focuses on the current multi-layered legal and regulatory framework, 
including with regard to PMSCs’ activities within peace operations and identifies the shortcomings 
that imperatively need to be addressed. Moreover, the third part addresses the situation of the Rapid 
Reaction Force, analyzing the necessary steps that the United Nations would have to follow in order 
to guarantee that the private Rapid Reaction Force would be held accountable in case of their 
infringement of international law provisions. Lastly, in the conclusion the challenges and benefits of 
the RRF will be reviewed in light of the political implications involved. 
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Part I: PMSCs’ use by the United Nations 
 
A. The rise of PMSCs: from archers and slingers to modern transnational 
companies 
 
The state’s monopoly over violence is the exception in world history, rather than the rule,1 and 
private armed groups have fought wars or supplemented regular armies for as long as there have 
been war and insecurity. In fact, the first documented reference of mercenaries takes us back to the 
reign of King Schulgi of Ur (ca 2094–2047 BC) in Mesopotamia, when outside fighters were paid 
to serve in its army.2 Hiring private soldiers was a general practice among Greek city-states as well, 
that used to recruit not only specialized warriors, but also entire naval units.3 Centuries later, hired 
troops filled some voids characteristic of the feudalism system, the backbone Europe’s middle age. 
To engage in a military campaign, feudal overlords had to resort to their vassals, which were 
obliged to provide troops for a limited period of time. To avoid mobilizing their subjects and 
thereby lose the necessary workforce and money, the vassals were given the chance to pay a tribute 
to the overlord who could then use it to bring in private soldiers.4 As a consequence, any medieval 
army had in its ranks private soldiers and the market for hired soldiers grew considerably. 
Mercenaries began to organize themselves in groups composed of skilled warriors, forming the first 
military organizations, named “free companies”, that rented themselves to the highest bidder.5 
These companies evolved into permanent military organizations, engaged with more and more 
complex and detailed contracts and soon became massively powerful. When the King of France 
fighted against them in 1362, his feudal army was overwhelmed and he lost the battle. In 1445, 
King Charles VII succeeded in reaching consensus among the bourgeois class and hired some of the 
companies to defeat the others ones present in the territory.6 At the end of its endeavour, instead of 
ending its contracts, the King kept the companies on his payroll, establishing the first standing army 
in Europe since centuries.7 After the Swiss Cantons united themselves into a country in 1291, the 
Swiss mercenaries became a kind of national industry consisted of men hiring out their services to 
the most disparate parties throughout Europe. The Swiss mercenaries gained soon an excellent 
reputation in Europe and fought in many battles for centuries to come. In addition, a contingent of 																																																								
1 P W Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (CUP, Ithaca 2003) 19.  
2 Ibid 20. 
3 Ibid 21. 
4 Ibid 22. 
5 Ibid 24. 
6 Ibid 26. 
7 Ibid.	
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Swiss mercenaries began serving the Pope in the 14th century and it is currently the only remaining 
Swiss mercenary troop in the world.8 During the 17th century, the European military sector was 
dominated by entrepreneurs providing forces to governments or rules who needed them in exchange 
to immense remunerations. At the beginning of the 19th century, the French Revolution and then the 
Napoleonic wars concluded the period in which the “free companies” played an important role in 
conflicts and war.9 Regular troops guided by national interests rather than driven by money became 
the rule and in the following centuries mercenaries were an exception. Still, the latter found a 
market in performing their services towards private companies, two of which – the English East 
India Company and the Dutch East India Company – used to employ private soldiers to protect their 
businesses around the globe.10 These businesses were operative in extremely unstable geopolitical 
contexts, i.e. in countries with very weak or even without government and had therefore to resort to 
private soldiers to ensure the protection of their outposts.11 However, from the end of the 19th 
century and throughout the two world wars, private soldiers did not play a pivotal role in the 
conflicts. The Westphalian state-centered system had prevailed and international norms against 
mercenaries began to emerge. Once predominant players, by the 20th century the free companies 
had largely disappeared. In their place, ex-soldiers were hired individually and once again the 
foremost figure of the private military market.12  In fact, despite the steady decline of free 
companies, the conflicts deriving from both cold war and decolonisation reignited the use of 
individuals acting as mercenaries. Private armed contractors were ideal partners for the two 
superpowers, which engaged them for their proxy wars in Asia, South America and Africa. In 
addition, they were particularly suitable for both the pursuit of the interests of large multinational 
corporations keen on exploiting natural resources in Africa and the European states’ wish to 
maintain their influence in the countries that were once under their control.13  
In the last couple of decades however, and in particular after the end of the Cold War, the world 
has experienced the evolution of a new phenomenon: the birth of a veritable industry that makes use 
of the capitalistic logic to fill the security vacuums that the States do or do not want to face. The 
essential difference of the new era as compared to the mercenaries of the 20th century is the 
corporatization of military services. To explain the development of the private military and security 
industry two fundamental changes that occurred in the second part of the last century have to be 
borne in mind: the emergence of “new wars” and the transfer of assets and services from the public 																																																								
8 Ibid 26–27. 
9 Ibid 29–30. 
10 Ibid 35. 
11 Ibid.	
12 Ibid 37. 
13 Ibid. 
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sector to the competitive markets of the private sector.14 While the end of the cold war surely is at 
the heart of PMSCs’ emergence, it served primarily as a catalyst for these long-term trends that 
supported the transfer of military services from the public to private entities.   
Significant shifts in the international security environment led into the development of a new 
type of war, characterized by low intensity and asymmetric conflicts. “New Wars”15 are marked by 
an unprecedented technological advancement and by the fact that States are no longer the only 
actors holding the monopoly over both war violence and the use of force. Contemporary conflicts 
involve a network of states and non-state actors, such as regular armed forces, terrorists, warlords, 
armed groups and, indeed, PMSCs.16 Technological advances have played a compelling role in 
shaping the contemporary conflicts and were material to the emergence of PMSCs. The increasing 
complexity of modern warfare has required appropriate responses that the private sector has been 
eager to provide. Although the means employed on the battlefield have always evolved in the 
course of the centuries, never before has humanity experienced such a transformation as the one we 
have seen since the end of the cold war. The level of technology that is being used by national 
armies and private actors today has reached such a level of complexity that regular armies often do 
not possess the technical capabilities to design and manufacture the weapons that the private sector, 
in contrast, is able to acquire, develop and maintain. In fact, private corporations offer modern war 
equipment in packages that include maintenance, training and sometimes even private personnel 
actually operating the product, such as in the case of drone operations.17 In other words, at times the 
soldiers simply do not posses the skills needed to maintain or to merely handle the weapons.  
In conjunction with the above-mentioned transformations of the way that war is conducted, he 
last decades of the 20th century were characterized by a gradual shift towards the belief in the 
superiority of the marketplace in addressing the needs of the state.18 The vigorous programme of 
denationalization and privatization that the Thatcher government undertook in the UK in the 1980s 
and the failures of command economies in the Soviet bloc led the world into a new era in which 
many countries around the globe followed the British example.19 The global trend to outsourcing 
also appeared in the security sector. The state abandoned some of the previously “untouchable 
areas”, among which the guarantee of security and protection, not only at a domestic level, but also 
in its foreign efforts. In order to preserve their national defense manufacturing industries that were 																																																								
14 Ibid 49. 
15 M Kaldor, ‘In Defence of New Wars’ (2013) 2(1) SInt’lJSD 1.  
<http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/49500/1/__lse.ac.uk_storage_LIBRARY_Secondary_libfile_shared_repository_Content_Kaldo
r,M_Kaldor_Defence_new_wars_2013_Kaldor_Defence_new_wars_2013.pdf> 
16 Ibid 2. 
17 See for example the case of Selex ES at Part I.D.3 of this paper.	
18 P W Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (CUP, Ithaca 2003) 66. 
19 Ibid 67. 
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under threat because of the escalating costs of research and development, numerous countries 
decided to undertake the path of denationalization and sold them to private corporations. 
The decrease in national armies’ defense budgets and the widespread demilitarization that 
followed the dismantling of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold war flooded the market with 
trained military professionals and cheap military equipment. An excessive amount of military 
material was sold across the world to everyone – not only states – who could afford it: warlords, 
armed militias and PMSCs. The oversupply of dislocated military skilled labour created a cheap and 
wide offer for the private sector to choose from. It should moreover be underlined that simple 
soldiers were not the only actors left jobless, but officers and Special Forces kept company with 
them.20 In addition, the end of the bipolarity that had dominated the world since the end of the 
Second World War wiped out the global order that had once been determined by the two 
superpowers and left several states once in the sphere of influence of the US and the Soviet Union 
without any support. The outcome is the striking weakness of a number of countries in the 
developing world. Large parts of the territory of some states have never been truly under 
government control and in others the political authority is the principal source of the instability.21 
Weak states that were already lacking stable political structures became increasingly incapable of 
governing their territories and resorted to PMSCs, which offered fast and effective solutions to their 
security concerns.   
All of these factors, if taken together, created an environment in which PMSCs could thrive, 
leading them towards great deals and success and resulting in a global, multi-billion dollar industry 
 
B. Defining private military and security companies  
 
Private Military and Security Companies are often referred to as employers of “modern 
mercenaries” or “mercenary firms”, composed of bullies and associated with human rights 
violations.22 By contrast, the private military and security industry has sometimes availed itself of 
euphemistic labels such as “security and risk management companies” or “risk mitigation 
companies”.23 These depictions of PMSCs either as evil corporations or as harmless services 
providers are both inaccurate and fallacious and stand in the way of an informed discussion on the 
use of the private sector in the battlefield, how to regulate its operations and on the spectrum of its 																																																								
20 Ibid 53. 
21 Ibid 55.	
22 José L. Gómez del Prado, ‘A United Nations Instrument to Regulate and Monitor Private Military and Security 
Contractors’ (2011) 1 Notre-DameJInt’l&CL 1, 4. 
23  See for example G4S Website <https://www.specialisttraining.g4s.com/training-courses/course-outline/risk-
management/> accessed 4 December 2016. 
	 	 6 
impact. The industry is heterogeneous and comprises large transnational companies selling their 
services all around the globe that are often in the center of media attention and smaller firms that 
operate locally and tend to be unnoticed. The companies perform a wide array of services on behalf 
of their clients, such as (armed and unarmed) guarding, VIP protection, security training, risk 
assessments, transportation as well as logistical services. The activities that the companies provide, 
rather than the actor conducting them, have been in the focus of the classification efforts in recent 
years. The 2008 Montreux Document on pertinent international legal obligations and good practices 
for states related to operations of private military and security companies during armed conflicts, 
created on an initiative of the Swiss Government and the ICRC, reiterates international law 
standards applicable to PMSCs and identifies PMSCs as “private business entities that provide 
military and/or security services, irrespective of how they identify themselves”.24  A similar 
approach is taken by another initiative, aimed as well at enhancing regulation of the industry: the 
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers (ICoC) focussing, however, on private 
security companies (PSCs) providing security – non military – services.25 When referring to its own 
contracting, the United Nations tends to avoid the term PMSCs, too, and resort to the less 
threatening PSC, leaving out the “military” part. Opposing this trend was the UN Working Group 
on the Use of Mercenaries by adopting the definition of PMSCs rather than PSC in the context of its 
discussion as to the use of private security by the UN.26 The terminology used by the rest of the UN, 
while convenient for the Organization, that would like to soften the military aspect of the 
companies that are regularly contracted, fail to grasp the broad scope of services that these private 
companies offer to the market. Delineating the boundaries between military companies and security 
companies is a though task as the businesses are usually conglomerates offering security in addition 
to military services. Therefore, in accordance with the interpretation of the UN Working Group and 
the Montreux Document, for the purpose of this work the term PMSC will identify a private 
corporate entity, able to provide a broad spectrum of both security and military activities, including 
direct combat.   
																																																								
24 ‘The Montreux Document on pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to 
operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict’ (17 September 2008) Preamble (9.a) 
<www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0996.pdf> accessed 22 November 2016.  
25 International Code of Conduct for Private Security Services Providers (9 November 2010) (ICoC) Definitions: 
‘Private Security Companies and Private Security Services Providers’. 
26 See for example United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), ‘Report of the Working Group on the use of 
mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-
determination’ (21 August 2014) 69th Session, UN Doc A/69/338.		
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C. Current use of PMSCs in UN peacekeeping operations  
 
Several calls of influential member states to carry out programmes in high-risk environments led 
the United Nations to adopt a new strategic vision in 2010.27 In order to support the delivery of UN 
mandated programmes and activities in these challenging situations, this involved, inter alia, a shift 
in the Organization’s security management policy from a “when-to-leave” to a “how-to-stay” 
approach.28 Unfortunately however, this shift and the resulting numerous attacks suffered by the 
UN were not followed by the necessary efforts by Member States to provide for the security of UN 
personnel and assets on the field.29 Therefore, the UN has seen itself forced to resort to other 
partners to mitigate these risks: Private Security and Military Companies.   
In order to provide security for its premises, personnel, property and activities, the UN bases its 
security arrangements on two principles: first, the host government’s responsibility to ensure the 
safety of UN operations, and second the unified and decentralised security management system of 
the Organization. 30  Pursuant to the 1994 Convention of the Safety of UN and Associated 
Personnel,31 signatory states are obliged to prevent attacks on UN peacekeeping staff and to 
investigate in case that such attacks take place while under the 2005 Optional Protocol,32 this 
responsibility is further extended to include all other UN operations. Unfortunately, many States in 
which the peacekeepers are dispatched are neither part to the Convention, nor to the Protocol33 and 
even if they were, because of their unstable context and weak governmental structures, they are 
likely to prove incapable of meeting the stringent security requirements that the UN is imposing. 
After the attacks on the UN headquarters in the Canal Hotel in Baghdad in 2003, the Secretary-
General established an independent panel of experts to conduct an assessment of the UN security 
management system in Iraq.34 The concluding report pointed out a general lack of observance and 
implementation of the relevant security regulations and procedures and concluded that the current 
																																																								
27 UNGA ‘Safety and Security of United Nations and associated personnel: Report of the Secretary-General’ (3 
September 2010) UN Doc A/65/344, 2. 
28 Ibid; see further UNGA ‘Report of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human 
rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination’ (21 August 2014) 69th Session, UN Doc 
A/69/338, 4.   
29 Ibid. 4–5.  
30 See UN Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq, ‘Report of the Independent Panel on 
the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq’ (20  October 2003) 3.  
31 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel (adopted 9 December 1994, entered into force 
15 January 1999) 2051 UNTS 363. 
32 UNGA ‘Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel’ (6 January 
2006) UN Doc A/Res/60/42. 
33 Åse Gilje Østensen, UN Use of Private Military and Security Companies: Practices and Policies (SSR Paper 3, 
DCAF, Geneva 2011) 21.  
34 See UN Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq, ‘Report of the Independent Panel on 
the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq’ (20  October 2003) 1.   	
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security management system was dysfunctional, thereby suggesting an urgent reform.35 As a result, 
in 2005 the UN established the new Department of Safety and Security (DSS), representing today 
the second pillar of the security arrangements of the UN. However, both principles have proved to 
be difficult in their application,36 and the UN had to consistently resort to external security in order 
to compensate these shortcomings. 
The extent of PMSCs’ employment by the UN has been the object of speculation for a long time. 
The Organization has been reluctant in sharing information on the issue until 2012, when for the 
first time the Secretary-General presented a report to the General Assembly on the UN use of 
private security.37 Starting 2012, a number of other documents have been published, allowing the 
public to understand the size of UN’s contracting activity with PMSCs. According to the 
information published by the Organization and several independent reports, PMSCs are being 
routinely employed by several offices, programmes, divisions and departments of the UN. 
Currently, the largest UN agency clients of PMSCs include the Children’s fund (UNICEF), the 
World Food Program (WFP), the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN 
Development Program (UNDP) and the UN Procurement Division, which contracts their services 
for all peacekeeping missions.38 Peacekeeping operations, together with UN special political 
missions, employed over 5’000 armed guards in 2012, for some USD 40 Mio worth of contracts 
according to the Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.39 
Despite having brought some new information that was very welcomed, the Report still failed to 
assess the full extent of PMSCs’ involvement in peace operations, because it reported only private 
companies employed directly by the missions themselves. In fact, besides being contracted directly 
by the Organization, PMSCs are being deployed within UN operations indirectly, notably hired by 
Member States: the personnel that composes the US contingent of UN civilian police for example is 
entirely made up by private contractors.40 In addition, PMSCs can also provide their services 
pursuant to a UN request but their remuneration is paid Member States: in Iraq, senior UN officials 
were protected by private contractors of Aegis and Global Risk, though allegedly paid by Member 
																																																								
35 Ibid Executive Summary. 
36 Åse Gilje Østensen, UN Use of Private Military and Security Companies: Practices and Policies (SSR Paper 3, 
DCAF, Geneva 2011) 22. 
37 UNGA ‘Report of the Secretary-General: Use of Private Security’ (22 October 2012) 67th Session, UN Doc 
A/67/539.  
38 Lou Pingeot, Dangerous Partnership: Private Military & Security Companies and the UN (Global Policy Forum and 
Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, New York 2012) 45–46. 
39 UNGA ‘Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions’ (7 December 2012) 67th 
Session, UN Doc A/67/624, Annex I and Annex II. 
40 Interestingly, till 2004 every US police officers taking part in the UN Civilian Police programme was provided by a 
single company, DynCorp International. See Lou Pingeot, Contracting Insecurity: Private military and security 
companies and the future of the United Nations (Global Policy Forum and Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, Bonn 2014) 7.  
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States.41  Finally, PMSCs can also be involved in UN operations by means of subcontracting. In this 
case, private contractors tasked by the UN to carry out non-security related parts of an operation 
deem the context to be too insecure and resort to PMSCs’ armed security.42  
 
1. Spectrum of the services outsourced by the UN to PMSCs 
 
The services provided by PMSCs to the UN are numerous and range from unarmed and armed 
security to intelligence gathering, demining, and even troops training. Despite the widespread lack 
of transparency within the UN over the exact details of the contracts, thanks to several news 
articles, studies and official reports, it is possible to sketch a list of the main services that the private 
sector is offering to the UN. 
• The UN often resorts to unarmed guards to provide security for its buildings, vehicles, staff 
and residences around the world. Although seemingly non-problematic, these duties can 
result in severe PR-related issues for the UN. Sometimes, UN-hired PMSCs do not provide 
their services exclusively to the Organization, but also to private multinationals, and can 
therefore be active with armed men in other contexts in the same region.43 This could lead 
the population to consider the armed guards protecting private businesses as being part of 
the UN mission and therefore their actions as UN actions.   
• The UN is employing armed security guards in a number of missions as well. Usually, their 
primary objective is to provide “static” security for buildings or personnel, but they can also 
be engaged in mobile responses when necessary.44 Private armed guards are increasingly 
escorting UN convoys carrying supplies or food.45  
• Though armed and unarmed security are the most notorious services provided by PMSCs, 
the UN contracts them also for training, risk assessment and consultancy. The Global Peace 
Operations Initiative (GPOI), a US-led effort designed to train peacekeepers and police 
troops for UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, has been outsourced to several PMSCs.46 
The US based Northrop Grumman Information Technology, MPRI and Blackwater USA, 
helped train thousands of troops that have been deployed to peacekeeping operations all 																																																								
41  James Cockayne, ‘Commercial Security in Humanitarian and Post-Conflict Settings: An Explorative Study’ 
(International Peace Academy, New York 2006) 10.  
42 Åse Gilje Østensen, UN Use of Private Military and Security Companies: Practices and Policies (SSR Paper 3, 
DCAF, Geneva 2011) 13. 
43 Lou Pingeot, Contracting Insecurity: Private military and security companies and the future of the United Nations 
(Global Policy Forum and Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, Bonn 2014) 24. 
44 Ibid 25. 
45 Ibid.  
46 Nina M Serafino, ‘The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress’ (CRS Report No 
RL32773) (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009) 6. 
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around the world. 47  Furthermore, thanks to the outsourcing of risk assessment and 
consultancy services, PMSCs have acquired great influence over the UN, in some cases 
even shaping their security understanding. Apparently, the entire structure of the UN DSS 
has been designed based on a comprehensive study of security requirements that was 
conducted by a specialized private security firm.48 
• Logistics: The UN has reportedly contracted with PMSCs for the provision of the necessary 
equipment to conduct peace operations, such as helicopters, armoured vehicles, airplanes 
and the support-personnel such as pilots and mechanics.49 Moreover, UN personnel have 
been ferried across Haiti along with troops and humanitarian supplies, by the International 
Charter Incorporated (ICI) of Oregon.50 The same company supported the UN in Sierra 
Leone by providing it with helicopters51 and both PAE and ArmorGroup supplied MONUC 
with logistical services.52 
• DDR and SSR: Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes (DDR) are 
designed to lead former combatants back into civilian life or into the host country’s new 
security apparatus that security sector reforms (SSR) help to create. Despite the critical 
importance of DDR in the effort of developing well-trained security forces and the crucial 
role of implementing SSR, such as police and judicial reform in the context of post conflict 
operations, the DPKO and the Department of Field Support are increasingly unable to 
recruit civilian specialists in these sectors.53 The impact of PMSCs in DDR and SSR seems 
to grow year by year and some companies are now even focussing on their peace-building 
capabilities instead of promoting their armed services.54  
• Other services: besides very specific contracts, the UN sometimes engages in contractual 
agreements with PMSCs with a very broad range of actions, without indications on the exact 
services they perform. Under these contracts, PMSCs have been used by the UN to provide 
demining services, telecommunications, police training, drones55 and have also helped with 
																																																								
47 Nina M Serafino, ‘The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress’ (CRS Report No 
RL32773 – Update June 11 2007) (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007) 18 (fn 28).  
48 See UNGA ‘Comprehensive management audit of the Department of Safety and Security: Report of the Office of 
Internal Oversight Services’ (26 September 2008) 63rd Session, UN Doc A/63/379, 7. 
49 Lou Pingeot, Dangerous Partnership: Private Military & Security Companies and the UN (Global Policy Forum and 
Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, New York 2012) 26. 
50 P W Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (CUP, Ithaca 2003) 183.   
51 Lou Pingeot, Dangerous Partnership: Private Military & Security Companies and the UN (Global Policy Forum and 
Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, New York 2012) 26. 
52 Åse Gilje Østensen, UN Use of Private Military and Security Companies: Practices and Policies (SSR Paper 3, 
DCAF, Geneva 2011) 39. 
53 Ibid 35. 
54 Ibid 36.	
55 See for example the case of Selex ES at Part I.D.3 of this paper. 
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the organization of national elections and much more. 56  Despite appearing to be 
uncontroversial, giving a closer look to these services shows a much more questionable 
reality. Under the rubric “translation” for example, employees of the firm CACI were 
involved in the torture of detainees in the well-know Abu-Ghraib prison in Iraq and under 
the rubric “aviation”, DynCorp acted on behalf of the CIA and was a prime contractor for 
the US programme of “extraordinary rendition”, involving kidnapping and torturing of 
perceived terrorists.57  
 
2. The identity of the companies employed by the UN 
 
Tracking these companies is a difficult task since commercial mergers are constant and name 
changes occur often.  The exact number and the names of the companies involved in UN 
Peacekeeping Missions have been for long the object of speculations. In fact, within the UN 
organization itself there have been some actors that pushed for transparency. The UN Working 
Group on the Use of Mercenaries (UN Working Group), created in 2005 by the UN Commission on 
Human Rights58 was tasked with investigating the UN’s use of PMSCs.59 The UN Working Group 
pointed out how difficult it was to access official information and, whilst acknowledging that since 
the end of 2012 this situation had shown significant improvements, it still criticized the report of the 
Secretary-General to the General Assembly of October 2012, noting that it was incomplete and did 
not provide any useful information on the names or even number of the PMSCs employed by the 
UN.60 According to the information received directly by the UN Working Group, and thus not 
contained in the official reports of other UN organs, the UN Working Group was able to indicate 
that some 30 PMSCs were involved in peacekeeping and special political missions in 2014.61 
Among them there were small local companies and big transnational corporations with local 
subsidiaries, like G4S, Securitas, DynCorp and Saladin.  
 
																																																								
56 Lou Pingeot, Dangerous Partnership: Private Military & Security Companies and the UN (Global Policy Forum and 
Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, New York 2012) 26. 
57 Ian Cobain and Ben Quinn, ‘How US firms profited from torture flights’ Guardian (London 31 August 2011) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/31/us-firms-torture-flights-rendition> accessed 08 November 2016. 
58 UN Commission on Human Rights, ‘Human Rights Resolution 2005/2: The Use of Mercenaries As a Means of 
Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-determination' (7 April 2005) UN 
Doc E/CN.4/RES/2005/2. 
59 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Mandate of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating 
human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination’ (28 March 2008) UN Doc 
A/HRC/Res/7/21. 
60 UNGA, ‘Report of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding 
the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination’ (21 August 2014) 69th Session, UN Doc A/69/338, 6. 
61 Ibid 5. 
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a) G4S 
 
G4S is the industry leader and has been a stable partner of the United Nations for many years, 
despite its poor performances and abuse cases. G4S employs some 610’000 people in more than 
100 countries62 and provides a variety of services – from risk consultancy and assessment to 
buildings’ and personnel’s security – to a wide clients base, composed mainly by governments. The 
company operates and maintains security systems in the Middle East, including the Ofer prison in 
the West Bank and other facilities dedicated to detention and interrogations in the region. Human 
rights organisations have called for their shut down, documenting systematic torture and ill 
treatment of Palestinian prisoners, including children.63 Following increasing pressure by civil 
society organisation fiercely condemning G4S involvement, UNICEF followed UNHCR in 
terminating its contract with G4S.64 Still, in 2015, the UN had around 40 contracts with G4S, 26 of 
which for unspecified “Public order and security and safety services”. These contracts were signed 
with several local subsidiaries of G4S, from Djibouti to Austria, from Hong Kong to Kenya and 
Zambia, and amounted to a total of some USD 7 Million.65 
 
b) DynCorp International  
 
DynCorp is an American PMSC specialized in training, flight operations, intelligence and 
security. The UN has made extensive use of DynCorp’s services from 2008 to 2011, mostly for 
unspecified “consultancy services”66, notwithstanding DynCorp’s involvement in one of the most 
notorious cases of sexual abuses in a UN mission.67 DynCorp provided police officers to the UN 
international police task force in Bosnia. An American police woman hired by DynCorp discovered 
that a number of UN officers, several of them employed by DynCorp, were involved in sexual 
																																																								
62  G4S Website <http://www.g4s.us/en-US/Who%20we%20are/Key%20Facts%20and%20Figures/> accessed 5 
December 2016. 
63  –, ‘G4S must end its complicity in Israel’s abuse of child prisoners’ Guardian (London 4 June 2014) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/04/g4s-complicity-israel-abuse-child-prisoners> accessed 5 December 
2016. 
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2016) <http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/unicef-terminates-services-security-contractor-operates-israel> 
accessed 5 December 2016. 
65 UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) ‘2015 Annual Statistical Report on United Nations Procurement’ (June 
2016) 316–628. 
66 See UNOPS ‘2008 Annual Statistical Report on United Nations Procurement’ (July 2009) 277; UNOPS ‘2009 
Annual Statistical Report on United Nations Procurement’ (July 2010) 277; UNOPS ‘2010 Annual Statistical Report on 
United Nations Procurement’ (July 2011) 263; UNOPS ‘2011 Annual Statistical Report on United Nations 
Procurement’ (July 2012) 268.  
67 Antony Barnett and Solomon Huges, ‘British firm accused in UN “sex scandal”’ Guardian (London 29 July 2001) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/jul/29/unitednations> accessed 2 December 2016.	
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abuses, forced prostitution and sex trafficking.68 As a consequence of this, DynCorp dismissed 
several of the employees but no one was further punished.69 Nevertheless, DynCorp remained 
involved in UN peace operations and was active particularly in Africa, where it conducted the 
complete re-establishment of the Armed Forces of Liberia within the United Nations Mission in 
Liberia (UNMIL) framework.70 
 
c) Askar Security Services 
 
Since 2012, MONUSCO has made extensive use of Askar Security’s services, engaging it first 
for unarmed security to protect its liaison offices in Kampala and the logistics base in Entebbe, both 
in Uganda,71 and then throughout the years for various security services. In 2013, Askar was 
awarded a USD 300’000 contract for “Security and personal safety”72, in 2014 it provided “Guards 
Services”73 for a total of some USD 135’000 and in 2015 it performed “Public order and security 
and safety services” as well as “Transportation services” for the UN.74 Like G4S and DynCorp 
international, Askar Security has been the object of a fair number of abuse allegations as well. The 
most prominent involved the exploitation of a number of contractors Askar had recruited, trained 
and then contracted to other PMSCs active in the Iraqi conflict and the company’s inadequate 
vetting process.75 As regards the latter, due to the fierce competition of other recruiters from 
neighbouring countries, Askar was no longer addressing military and police veterans but, as an 
Ugandan Journalist stated, “Anyone could go”76  
 
As laid out in this section, PMSCs are hired by the UN in a number of peace operations. While 
the increased reliance of the Organization on PMSCs is first a consequence of the emergence of the 
industry itself that has given the UN a “respectable” private partner, the quick evolution and 
professionalization that peacekeeping operations have undertaken is another major cause of this 
strong involvement of the private sector.  																																																								
68 Ibid. 
69  Nisha Lilia Diu, ‘What the UN Doesn’t Want You To Know’ Telegraph (London 6 February 2012) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/film/9041974/What-the-UN-Doesnt-Want-You-to-Know.html> accessed 2 
December 2016. 
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(Global Policy Forum and Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, Bonn 2014) 8. 
72 UNOPS ‘2013 Annual Statistical Report on United Nations Procurement’ (July 2013) 338. 
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D. The evolution of UN peacekeeping operations 
 
Since the first interposition force during the Suez crisis in 1956, peacekeeping operations have 
come a long way. The UN has seen a gradual evolution of its role of maintaining and establishing 
peace around the world and its operations have become large, complex multifunctional efforts, 
charging peacekeepers with protecting civilians, facilitating peace processes, electoral assistance 
and much more. 77  Alongside UN forces, PMSCs have taken part to the expansion of the 
Organization’s sphere of action, carrying increasingly complex tasks and becoming an integral part 
of every major UN operation. 
 
1. Peacekeeping principles  
 
Throughout the 1940s the UN set up several observation and supervision missions in Greece, 
Kashmir, Korea and Indonesia.78 Two main factors prompted the UN to establish these missions as 
measures to keep the peace. The first was the decolonisation: in fact, the two first official UN 
mission, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in Palestine, and the United 
Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) have been ignited by the 
withdrawal of the British colonial forces in India and Palestine and the crisis that followed. The 
second factor was the block of the Security Council due to the tensions between the US and the 
Soviet Union from 1947 onwards, that virtually inhibited the Organization to implement the UN 
Charter’s system of collective security.79 In 1956, following the attack on Egypt by the British, 
Israeli and French armies, the General Assembly decided to bypass the Security Council – at the 
time incapacitated by the French and British vetoes – and tasked UN Secretary-General Dag 
Hammarskjöld to form a military force to intervene in the conflict.80 The 5th of November 1956, 
with Resolution 1000, the General Assembly accepted Hammarskjöld’s recommendations and 
approved the establishment of UNEF, the first official “peacekeeping operation”.81 Two years later, 
in 1958, Hammarskjöld presented a report on UNEF containing what have been considered as being 
the three founding principles of UN peacekeeping from then on:82 (i) the consent of the Member 																																																								
77 See UNGA ‘Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations’ (21 August 2000) 55th Session UN Doc 
A/55/305 vii-ix, 3-5. 
78 Ramesh Thakur, The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect 
(5th edn CambUP, Cambridge 2009) 35. 
79 Ronald Hatto, ‘From peacekeeping to peacebuilding: the evolution of the role of the United Nations in peace 
operations’ (2013) 95 Int’lRRC 495, 500. 
80 Ibid 502. 
81 Ibid 496. 
82 UNGA ‘Summary study of the experience derived from the establishment and operation of the Force: Report of the 
Secretary-General’ (9 October 1958) 13th Session UN Doc A/3943.  
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State party to the conflict,83 (ii) the impartiality of the force,84 and (iii) the non-use of force except 
in cases of self-defence.85 Every peacekeeping operation set up during the Cold War – with the 
notable exception of the UN operation in Congo (ONUC) 86  – fully complied with these 
principles.87 
 
2. After the end of the Cold War: from traditional peacekeeping to “robust” operations 
 
The end of the Cold War represented a turning point for UN peacekeeping operations, which 
increased in number and became multifunctional. The establishment of the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and its associated structures in 1992 reflected the increased 
importance of peacekeeping, providing the necessary structure for the successful expansion of the 
operations’ functions. The new, expanded mandates of multi-dimensional operations and the role 
that PMSCs played along the way are exemplified in the UN intervention in the former Yugoslavia. 
In 1992 the Security Council called upon its Member States to take “all necessary measures” to 
deliver humanitarian aid to Sarajevo and throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.88 Between 1992 and 
1995, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) relied on several PMSCs to fulfill its mandate in the 
former Yugoslavia; among them were DynCorp and Defence System Limited (DSL). DSL, a UK 
based PMSC, provided UNPROFOR with 425 staff members who carried out a number of 
functions, including security officers assigned to crime prevention, crime detection, protection and 
border security.89 DSL personnel were fully integrated into the UNPROFOR organisation, wearing 
“civilian pattern UN uniform with UN badges and identification papers”.90 As the mission grew, 
DSL began carrying out operational peacekeeping tasks, “with DSL drivers in armoured vehicles, 
maintained and fuelled by DSL support teams, out of bases constructed and maintained by DSL and 
co-ordinated by DSL planners in Zagreb”.91  
The same year as the UN Protection Force was set up, following the success of the intervention 
against Iraq in 1991 and at the request of the Security Council, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali was asked to prepared a document detailing his “analysis and recommendations on ways of 																																																								
83 Ibid [155]–[156]. 
84 Ibid [166]–[167]. 
85 Ibid [179]. 
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strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the 
capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peacekeeping”.92 
His report, An Agenda for Peace, was published in June 1992 and contained some major conceptual 
changes from traditional peacekeeping and a departure from the basic principles described above. 
First, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali undermined arguably the most important of the three 
fundamentals of peacekeeping – namely the consent of the parties – by letting the door open for 
future intervention without the host state’s consent.93 The second pillar, the non-use of force except 
in self-defence, was also reconsidered.94 In this regard, Mr. Boutros-Ghali’s idea was to deploy 
additional, so called “peace enforcement units”95 on the field in the event that the traditional 
“peacekeeping units” were unable to carry out the task. The operations in Somalia, Bosnia and 
Rwanda followed this new approach, forfeiting the consent of the parties, behaving in a way that 
was perceived to be partial and making use of force other than in self-defence.96 The traumatic 
experiences of the UN in those three missions in particular were taken into account by Boutros-
Ghali when in 1995 he published the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace.97 In his Supplement 
Boutros-Ghali, underscoring the new tasks that internal conflicts had imposed on the Blue Helmets, 
stressed the importance of diplomacy instead of the use of military power in order to ensure the 
success of the missions.98 Boutros-Ghali noted that the conflicts that the UN was asked to resolve 
had deep roots and that their resolution necessitated the establishment of a political process, 
enabling the parties to build the necessary confidence and to find negotiated solutions.99 Subsequent 
peacekeeping efforts build up on Boutros-Ghali considerations, and the wave of missions set up at 
the end of the 1990s and in the beginning of the new century were tasked with expanded mandates. 
The missions in Sierra Leone, East Timor and the Democratic Republic of the Congo conducted 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) operations and security sector reforms (SSR) 
targeting the police and the army of the host governments.100 In the landmark Brahimi Report, 																																																								
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Peace Operations were said to entail three main activities: conflict prevention and peacemaking 
(through diplomacy and mediation), peacekeeping (through interposition as buffers, ceasefire 
observation and demilitarization), and peace-building (through training and technical assistance).101 
As highlighted in the UN Peacekeeping operations Principles and Guidelines of 2008 (later updated 
in 2010), the boundaries between the different missions have become increasingly blurred and, as 
experience has shown, multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations are required, and forced by 
the circumstances, to bear the burden of a multitude of peace-building responsibilities.102 In order to 
fulfill their mandates in more hostile environments, where the consent of the warring parties has not 
always been assured, peacekeeping operations increasingly relied on the private sector and 
progressively shifted their defensive approach towards a more aggressive conduct. In fact, while 
Boutros-Ghali did indeed reconsider his initial thought as to more “aggressive” operations, the shift 
took place nonetheless. Peace enforcement and “robust” peacekeeping represent today the new 
frontier for UN peace operations: as a matter of fact, recently established UN peace operations, such 
as MINUSMA in Mali and MINUSCA in the Central African Republic, operating in highly volatile 
environments follow the new approach of the UN as they include very robust mandates.  
An example of both the evolution that UN peacekeeping missions have been through and of the 
role that PMSCs had within this process, is the UN intervention in Congo, which particularly in 
recent years has moved from a mostly observation-oriented mission to a “robust”, multi-
dimensional operation.  
 
3. The UN involvement in Congo, the Intervention Brigade and PMSCs’ role 
 
The conflict in the Congo is long and complex, involving numerous state and non-state armed 
actors. The UN has been present in the region since the 1960s and its involvement in the country 
has been long-standing and has evolved throughout the years along the conflict itself. The United 
Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), established in 1960, had the initial mandate of ensuring 
the withdrawal of Belgian forces and of assisting the government in maintaining law and order. The 
mandate was revised in 1961 to permit UN troops to use mass force against mercenaries and the 
rebels103 in order to prevent the secession of the Katanga Province, financed, orchestrated and 
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supported with mercenaries by foreign parties.104 After the withdrawal of UN forces in 1964, Congo 
failed to remain united and between 1965 and 1997 the country experienced numerous crises. 
Precisely because of these crises, in 1999 the UN returned to Congo for another Peacekeeping 
Operation. This time, however, it would stay much longer. The UN Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) was established in 1999 with the initial aim of observing 
the ceasefire and the disengagement of foreign forces and rebel groups.105 Confronted with a bloody 
conflict, the mission was steadily enlarged and its mandate expanded. MONUC evolved from a 
traditional peacekeeping operation to a full-scale multi-dimensional peace operation, that included 
the supervision of the ceasefire’s implementation, the verification of force disengagement and 
redeployment, the provision of support for humanitarian work and civilian protection.106 In 2006, 
after the first general elections in Congo in 46 years, the mandate was further expanded, and 
MONUC was asked to implement “multiple political, military, rule of law and capacity-building 
tasks … including trying to resolve ongoing conflicts in a number of the DRC provinces”.107 Forced 
by such an unstable environment, throughout the years MONUC made extensive use of PMSCs 
services. In 2001, MONUC hired PAE for the provision of food, fuel and water, despite it’s history 
of being accused of overcharging.108 PAE has proven to be an integral part of the UN mission in 
Congo during the protests that followed the massacres of 2005. Following the incapacity of the UN 
to protect civilians from the fights among different armed militias,109 in June 2005 Congolese 
students attacked UN associated personnel and facilities in protest.110 UN personnel flew from the 
city and reached the local airport, one of the six that PAE was managing for MONUC.111 PAE 
contractors planned, developed and executed the evacuation of the personnel and then stayed on the 
ground to complete their mandate. It shall be stated at this point that, apparently, the possibility of 
an evacuation was included in the contract between PAE and MONUC.112 PAE was not the only 
PMSC supporting MONUC: ArmorGroup provided security and logistics to the mission113 and a 
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part of the peacekeepers deployed by MONUC stem from the GPOI training programme.114 PMSCs 
were later involved in the UN effort that followed MONUC, the UN Organization Stabilization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), established by the Security Council in 
2010.115 The new mission received broad powers and was authorized to use “all necessary means” 
to protect civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders and to support the DRC’s 
government in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts. MONUSCO hired Saracen Uganda 
to provide security services in 2010 and 2011,116 despite the allegations of illegal exploitation of 
natural resources reported back in 2001 to the Security Council.117  
Despite its broad powers, MONUSCO did not succeed in its effort to support the government 
and the violence threatened to destabilize the entire Great Lakes region, encompassing parts of 
Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and the DRC. In response to several calls by these 
governments, in March 2013 the Security Council adopted Resolution 2098, extending the mandate 
of MONUSCO and creating a special “Intervention Brigade” able to carry out offensive actions, 
thereby stepping up the scale of violence that the Organization was ready to apply in order to secure 
its objectives.118 In order to observe military personnel movements, Res 2098 gave also the formal 
go-ahead to expand the surveillance capabilities of the mission by deploying unmanned aerial 
system: drones.119 The UN outsourced the programme to an Italian manufacturer that provided the 
surveillance planes, Selex ES.120 The contract did not only included the drones; throughout its 
American subsidiary Selex Galileo,121 Selex ES provided the UN with ground control stations, 
logistical support, and a team composed of pilots, mechanics and intelligence analysts experts.122 
 
As shown in its involvement in Congo, the UN is increasingly asked to deploy its peacekeeping 
operations into more volatile environments, where there might be no peace to maintain; today, two 																																																								
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thirds of peacekeeping personnel are deployed in zones of ongoing conflicts.123 Security services 
expenses grow accordingly: only in the UN mission in Congo, the costs have skyrocketed in the last 
years, from approximately USD 520.000 in 2006 to more than USD 6 Mio in 2011, while total costs 
for field missions’ use of security services around the globe grew from USD 3.7 Mio in 2006 to an 
astonishing USD 26.4 Mio in 2011.124 The primary beneficiary of the surge of the UN’s security 
needs have been PMSCs, thereby getting progressively closer to the frontline of UN operations. 
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Part II: The legal and regulatory framework for PMSCs hired by the 
UN  
 
The spectacular rise of the Private Military and Security Industry and the increasing deployment 
of PMSCs by States and International Organizations have drawn the attention of observers, 
policymakers and interested actors to the growing role of private security on the battlefield and the 
related concerns. A number of NGOs and think thanks are alarmed that PMSCs operate without the 
necessary oversight, in a situation of lacking transparency and legal accountability as regards their 
activities.125 As a consequence, PMSCs are perceived to operate in a legal vacuum and their abuses 
– including the most aberrant such as torture and murder – are thought to go regularly 
unpunished.126 This perception is further corroborated by numerous scandals involving PMSCs’ 
brutality, such as CACI’s involvement in Abu Ghraib. The company had been hired by the US 
government to recruit intelligence analysts and interrogators for the infamous Abu Ghraib prison in 
Iraq.127 Following the publication of pictures portraying naked detainees, tied and beaten by the 
guards, an internal US army report128 found that CACI, together with another PMSC, was 
implicated in the abuses, with private contractors using dogs to scare prisoners and encouraging US 
soldiers to abuse them.129 Furthermore, the investigation noted that the incidents were not isolated; 
instead, systemic management and training problems were identified, with a third of CACI’s 
employees that had never received formal military interrogation training. 130 However, while 
military personnel were convicted in court, private contractors remained exempt, in part because at 
the time they enjoyed immunity from both US military justice and Iraqi courts.131 On October 2016 
however, a US federal court of appeal reinstated the case brought by four Iraqis against CACI that 
was previously dismissed in 2008 on the ground of a jurisdictional challenge.132 While the abuses of 
CACI’s employees are not an isolated case, the perception that private contractors operate in a legal 
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vacuum is misconceived: PMSCs and their staff are subject to a number of public international law 
branches. However, the extent of their accountability depends very much on their employer and 
how the contractual relationship under which they operate is structured. In this sense, while many 
initiatives – some of which driven by the private military and security industry itself – have pushed 
for the creation of legal and regulatory instruments that encompass PMSCs activities, the UN has 
not kept the pace and is lacking behind in controlling the conduct of its private partners. Luckily, 
the accountability of PMSCs’ employees hired by the UN does not depend exclusively on the 
contractual relationship with the hiring entity. In fact, whenever private contractors are operating in 
situations of armed conflicts their conduct is subject to the provisions of International Humanitarian 
Law.  
 
A. PMSCs’ employees under International Humanitarian Law 
 
As noted above, PMSCs’ employees deployed in peacekeeping operations are getting 
increasingly closer to the heart of military operations in situations of armed conflicts and are 
therefore obliged to respect the provisions of international humanitarian law (IHL). However, the 
difficulty in applying IHL to PMSCs’ employees in the context of UN peace operations stems from 
the legal status of the contractors that needs to be determined on a case-by-case basis depending on 
the functions that they are tasked to carry out and their integration within the armed forces.133 Under 
IHL, private contractors can fall into several categories; depending on the situation, they could be 
considered members of the armed forces according to Art. 43 of the Additional Protocol I of the 
Geneva Conventions; mercenaries under Art. 47 of the same Protocol, civilians, or “civilians 
accompanying the armed forces” within the meaning of Art. 4 A (4) of the third Geneva 
Convention. This categorization is crucial as it determines the rights and privileges of PMSCs’ 
employees and the legal consequences deriving from their conduct. Before embarking into the 
analysis of the private contractors’ status two preliminary observations are necessary. First, it 
should be noted that IHL is not concerned with the lawfulness or legitimacy of PMSCs per se. IHL 
only regulates their behaviours if they are active in an armed conflict. Second, the rules of IHL that 
apply to a given conflict depend on whether it is considered an “international armed conflict” 
(IAC), concerning a conflict between states, or a “non-international armed conflict” (NIAC), 
concerning a broader category of conflicts often taking place within a single state. As the UN acts 
primarily in support of state armed forces against organized armed groups – such as in the case of 																																																								
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MONUSCO –the first conclusion that would be drawn is that peacekeeping operations are deployed 
in a context of NIAC. However, some have argued that the mere involvement of multinational 
forces in an armed conflict is sufficient to transform the conflict into an IAC,134  or have 
characterized these types of conflict as “multinational NIAC”.135 While the question as to the legal 
framework which should be applied to the conflicts in which UN peacekeeping are deployed is still 
debated, it should be stressed that most treaty-based applicable in IAC are also generally applicable 
in NIAC as customary law.136 However, there still are some differences, in particular when it comes 
to the status of persons deprived of liberty. 
 
1. Are PMSCs’ employees modern mercenaries? 
 
In expressing their concerns about the PMSCs’ use by the UN, many commentators have argued 
that private contractors are the modern equivalent of mercenaries and should therefore be banned 
under international law.137 In the context of an IAC, individuals could qualify as mercenaries 
according to the definition of Art. 47 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. 
However, the definition contained in Art. 47 is very narrowly construed as it includes a number of 
cumulative conditions that are rarely fulfilled.138 In particular, the requirements of being “recruited 
to fight”139 and that of being “neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory 
controlled by a Party to the conflict”140 have been identified as difficult to be met by modern 
PMSCs’ staff.141 In fact, PMSCs often recruit locally and in the majority of cases are hired to 
provide tasks that do not amount to “fight”. As a consequence private contractors do not usually fall 																																																								
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into the category of mercenaries under Art. 47 of the Additional Protocol I, which only applies in 
IAC. Furthermore, IHL is silent on the position of mercenaries in NIAC. However, since the only 
consequence of being a mercenary under Art. 47 is the loss of the status of combatant and prisoner 
of war and since these two status do not exist in NIAC, this does not represent an issue and should 
not be further analysed in the present paper. 
 
2. PMSCs’ employees as civilians or combatants? 
 
In order to spare the civilian population from hostilities and their effects, IHL expects parties to 
an armed conflict to distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between 
civilian objectives and military objectives. According to the rules on the conduct of hostilities, the 
civilian population enjoys general protection against the effects of hostilities, while combatants may 
be directly targeted. The distinction is therefore fundamental in ascertaining the rights and 
obligations of private contractors.  
In the context of IACs, civilians are defined negatively as all persons who do not belong to the 
armed forces of a Party of the conflict.142 According to Art. 43 (1) of the Additional Protocol I, the 
armed forces of a Party are all the organized forces, groups and units, which are under a command 
responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates. Thus, all armed actors that show a 
sufficient degree of military organization and that belong to a Party of the conflict are regarded as 
part of the armed forces of that Party.143 In order to “belong” to a Party of the conflict, PMSCs’ 
employees need to be incorporated into its armed forces, either de jure through a formal procedure 
pursuant to national law, or de facto by being granted a “continuous combat function”.144 While 
PMSCs may be hired by one of the Party of an IAC, the mere existence of a contractual relationship 
to provide assistance to the Party’s armed forces is not conclusive.145 Instead, possible indicators of 
such membership include: contractors being subject to military discipline and justice, being subject 
to the military chain of command and control, forming part of the military hierarchy, wearing forms 
of identification similar to those of ordinary members of the armed forces or wearing army 
uniforms.146 Usually, PMSCs’ staff are not subject to the recruitment procedures and formal 																																																								
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subordination such as regular soldiers and it is therefore indeed very rare that a PMSC would be 
considered formally incorporated into the armed forces of a Party through a de jure affiliation.147 
The examples of PMSCs being fully incorporated within national armed forces are very scarce 
today148 and date back to the 1990s. Before fighting for the government of Sierra Leone in the civil 
war of 1995-6, Executive Outcomes personnel was formally integrated into the national armed 
forces,149 just as Sandline personnel was considered as being into the Papua New Guinea army as 
“Special Constables” in 1997.150 However, PMSCs and their employees could be considered part of 
the armed forces by virtue of a de facto incorporation, as defined in Art. 43 (1) of the Additional 
Protocol I.151 The criterion that the units or groups are “under a command responsible” to a Party is 
critical in ascertaining and defining the status of the private contractors.152 Although PMSCs 
usually fall outside the military chain of command and control, the notion of “command” under Art. 
43 (I) is flexible. In fact, Art. 43 (I) does not call for the existence of a military chain of command, 
leaving open the possibility of another type of command, consisting, for example, of private 
individuals.153 The standard of the “command responsible” requires a certain degree of oversight by 
the Party and would be met if the hiring entity established an appropriate supervision and control 
mechanism. This shall include specific provisions on the contracts regarding the respect of the law 
of international armed conflicts and the consequences of eventual violations, a reporting and 
supervision mechanism allowing the control of the contractors’ behaviour on the ground, and 
finally the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over the private security companies’ personnel.154 While 
the practices of several States show a trend towards the exercise of wider jurisdiction over PMSCs’ 
personnel, the measures implemented often lack the necessary oversight and in particular the 
required control mechanism.155 In addition, PMSCs perform increasingly complex functions that 
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require impressively convoluted contractual relationships, thus making it even more difficult to 
establish a clear chain of command. A similar complication arises in the event of a PMSC 
subcontracting part of its tasks. In this case the control that the Party may be able to exercise over 
the subcontractor is likely to be very weak, although some commentators argued that as long as the 
subcontractor is asked to carry out an integral part of the prime contract performance, it should be 
considered as acting on behalf of the Party, provided, of course, that the control that the Party 
exercises over the prime contractor has met the threshold of Art. 43 (I) Additional Protocol I.156  
Private contractors might also be considered as “[p]ersons who accompany the armed forces 
without actually being members thereof”157 and thus be excluded from the definition of combatant. 
The United States follow this approach and in the US Army Manual “Contractors on the 
Battlefield” it is stated that “[c]ontractors and their employees are not combatants but civilians 
‘authorized’ to accompany the force in the field”.158 Art. 4 (A)(4) of the Third Geneva Convention 
provides a list of persons who could qualify as civilians accompanying the armed forces, including 
“civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors”159  and 
requires that they “have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, who 
shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card”.160 Allegedly, however, the last two 
requirements are not always met by PMSCs,161 that are often subcontracted and thus might not 
enjoy the armed forces’ authorization. Furthermore, civilians accompanying the armed forces are 
not entitled to participate in the hostilities. Hence, PMSCs carrying out tasks that amount to direct 
participation in a conflict shall not be considered as such.162 
The same observations in regard to the distinction between civilians and combatants of PMSCs’ 
employees apply, mutatis mutandis, in the context of a NIAC.163 However, some peculiarities of 
NIACs have to be taken into account. States are loath to grant the privilege of combatants to 
insurgents and therefore in treaty law governing NIAC there is no reference to the term 
“combatant”, but instead Additional Protocol II uses the terms “civilian population” and “civilian”, 
declaring the loss of their protection if “they take a direct part in hostilities”. This suggests that also 
within a NIAC there are two categories of persons whose treatment is different under IHL. The 																																																								
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second category – the first being civilians – is sometimes called “fighters” (reflecting the remaining 
difference between IAC and NIAC) and sometimes “combatant”, like in the case of an IAC. While 
the concepts are still not defined in practice, it suffices to say that in the event that the above-
mentioned conditions regarding the combatant status in IACs are fulfilled, private contractors 
would also considered part of the forces of one of the Parties to a NIAC.164  
 
3. Direct participation in hostilities 
 
Despite the fact that PMSCs employees are more likely not to be considered part of the armed 
forces of a Party involved in the conflict, they could loose their civilian status if they participate 
directly in the hostilities.165 While there is no definition of what constitutes “direct participation in 
hostilities” neither in IHL Treaties nor in international jurisprudence, there seems to be an emerging 
opinion among experts with reference to the constitutive elements of this notion. In order to be 
considered as a direct participation in hostilities, an act performed by PMSCs’ employees should 
meet three cumulative requirements. First, the act should be likely to adversely affect the military 
operations or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict; second, there must be a direct causal 
link between the act and the harm inflicted by the it or by the coordinated military operation of 
which the act is an integral part, and third, the act must be designed to directly cause the intended 
harm in support of a Party and to the detriment of another.166 The determination of the civilian or 
military nature of PMSC’s activity can be extremely difficult sometimes, and the same task could 
be regarded, on the one hand, as direct participation in hostilities or, on the other, as simple law 
enforcement operation depending on the perspective adopted. Against this backdrop, the defence of 
military personnel or military premises against criminal acts that are unrelated to the hostilities 
would not be considered as a direct participation in hostilities, but the defence of the same persons 
and objects against enemy attacks would indeed, although the attacks could well be difficult to 
differentiate from the PMSCs’ point of view.167 It is undeniable that PMSCs are increasingly asked 
to carry out specific tasks that could amount indeed to direct participation, such as the defence of 
military objectives,168 certain specific intelligence gathering operations169 and rescue operations of 																																																								
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military personnel or even civilian and military hostages.170 However, since some of the activities 
performed by PMSCs fall in grey areas, it is particularly important to favour a restrictive approach 
of the notion of “direct participation in hostilities”, consistent with the general rules of IHL on 
precautions and presumptions in situations of doubt.171 Consequently, in case of doubt as to whether 
the PMSC’s specific conduct amount to a direct participation in hostilities, the general rule of 
civilian protection is presumed to apply, and the conduct should not qualify as “direct 
participation”.172 Accordingly, the majority of scholars still believe that PMSCs’ employees should 
generally be considered as civilians under IHL.173 
Also in this case the direct participation in hostilities of private contractors within a NIAC poses 
only marginally distinct legal issues from participation in IACs: PMSCs’ employees would qualify 
as civilians in the event that the requirements are note met, with the possibility of loosing their 
civilian status in the same way as in the context of an IAC.174 
 
4. Legal consequences of the private contractors’ status  
 
a) Consequences of the private contractors’ status on the battlefield 
 
Having determined that PMSCs’ might be granted combatant status, the consequence is specific 
attacks could be directed against them, unless they are considered to be hors de combat (i.e. when 
not taking part in the hostilities because of sickness, wounds, capture or by any other cause).175 On 
the contrary, if they are considered civilians, they are protected against attacks unless they take part 
in hostilities, in which case they would loose the protection as long as their participation lasts. In the 
event of a private contractor considered to be a civilian performing an isolated act amounting to a 
“direct participation in hostilities”, it would thus regain the protection afforded to the civilian status 																																																																																																																																																																																								
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as soon as the act in question is concluded.176 The situation in which an entire company is being 
tasked to perform such activities however is more complicated. Should all the personnel of that 
company, regardless of their function, become a valid target to any attack or should only the ones 
who are mandated to take part directly in hostilities become such a target? According to several 
experts the loss of civilian protection against direct attack should not be based on the fact that a 
person is employed by a specific company alone, “but additionally on the function fulfilled by an 
individual member within the group”.177 If that function requires a member to take direct part in 
hostilities on a regular or continuous basis, than the member would lose protection against direct 
attack for as long as that function is being fulfilled”.178 This approach struck the right balance 
between an overly extensive cover that would have included all the company’s personnel even if 
they are not participating in the act, and overcoming the danger of having private contractors 
exploiting their civilian status claiming the benefit of immunity from attack whenever they drop 
their arms. 
 
b) Consequences of the private contractors’ status on his individual criminal liability 
 
At a domestic level, PMSCs’ employees who are not considered combatants could be held 
accountable and be prosecuted for the acts committed during the conflict.179 Since only combatants 
have the right to participate directly in hostilities, PMSCs’ employees that qualify as civilians could 
be tried for the mere fact of having taken part in the fights.180 However, since PMSCs usually 
operate in failed states or war zones, the territorially responsible state is often unable or unwilling to 
prosecute them and their staff.181  
Irrespective of their legal status, private contractors culpable of sever infringements of IHL, in 
both international and non-international armed conflicts, can be held accountable pursuant to the 
universal jurisdiction of the Geneva Conventions’ war crimes provisions.182 Theoretically, PMSCs’ 																																																								
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employees could be prosecuted before any state or before any international tribunal that has 
jurisdiction. However, not all states have adopted legislations enabling them to prosecute 
individuals on the basis of universal jurisdiction and when they do, they usually link it to specific 
state-related conditions.183 This obligation therefore has not been put into practice very often and 
the rare trials on the basis of universal jurisdiction have not been against members of PMSCs.184 
In addition, regardless of their position as civilians or combatants,185 private contractors could be 
taken to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for having committed war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and genocide according to Art. 5(1) of the ICC Statute provided that the crime occurs on 
the territory of a state party to the Statute or that the accused is a national of a state party. 
Particularly problematic in this regard is the fact that the US – despite being the country of origin of 
many private contractors – still refuses to ratify the ICC Statute and regularly arranges immunity 
treaties with the states in which its military forces and the PMSCs supporting them are operating. 
Nevertheless, according to Art. 13b of the ICC Statute, the SC, acting under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, may opt to refer a matter to the ICC Prosecutor even if it involves a PMSCs hired by the 
US. However, the scope of international criminal responsibility is limited to the most severe 
breaches and at the same time crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity entail such elements 
of either systematic or widespread commission of the crimes making them difficult to be carried out 
by PMSCs. If a PMSC’s employee is tried before the ICC, it would be most likely for war 
crimes.186 An undisputed condition for imputing war crimes to private contractors is the existence 
of a link between the agent and war, i.e. the illicit act might qualify as a war crime only if it is 
connected to an armed conflict.187 To establish the existence of the nexus between criminal conduct 
and war, a case-by-case evaluation of the conduct of PMSCs’ personnel is necessary.  This should 
be implemented either with a particular eye to the objective context in which the conduct takes 
place (the criminal conduct must be committed because of the war)188 or according to the subjective 
position of the private contractor (in this case it is assumed that a link exist whenever the 																																																																																																																																																																																								
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perpetrator is connected at least de facto with a party to the conflict).189 Accordingly, PMSCs’ 
activities such as CACI’s interrogations at Abu Ghraib or the killing of civilians by Blackwater’s 
employees in Iraq could be prosecuted as war crimes.190 
 
c) Consequences of the private contractors’ status in case of capture 
 
Finally, the legal status of PMSCs’ employees under IHL has implications over the POW status 
as well. In the context of IACs, if private contractors are considered combatants, the third Geneva 
Convention provides them with a wide range of protection for POW, defining their rights and 
setting down detailed rules for their treatment and eventual release. By contrast, civilians can not 
attain POW status in IACs but are protected by the fourth Geneva Convention and the first 
Additional Protocol thereto. A different conclusion has to be drawn in the case of “civilians 
accompanying the armed forces”. While private contractors who have been granted the status of 
“civilians accompanying the armed forces” are commonly considered civilians as regards the 
conduct of hostilities, according to Art. 4 (A)(4) GC III in IAC they are entitled to POW status 
nonetheless.191 Lastly, given that in situations of NIAC the POW status does not exist, private 
contractors who fall in the hands of the enemy maintain the basic guarantees provided under 
Common Art. 3 of the Geneva Conventions, in the Additional Protocol II thereto and – of course – 
under customary international law.192 
 
B. International Human Rights Law applicable to the conduct of PMSCs  
 
While humanitarian law applies both to state and non-state actors and therefore even private 
contractors can infringe IHL, the application of human rights to PMSCs and their staff is far more 
controversial. PMSCs activities are indeed regulated by IHRL, although they are not directly bound 
by it. While under classic international human rights law codified in treaties private parties do not 
usually have obligations, in a number of states PMSCs are be bound by human rights through 																																																								
189  Ottavio Quirico, ’The Criminal Responsibility of Private Military and Security Company Personnel under 
International Humanitarian Law’ in Francesco Francioni and Natalino Ronzitti (eds), War by Contract: Human Rights, 
Humanitarian Law, and Private Contractors (OUP, Oxford 2011) 431; [1999] ICTR-95-1-T [174] ff.	
190  Ottavio Quirico, ’The Criminal Responsibility of Private Military and Security Company Personnel under 
International Humanitarian Law’ in Francesco Francioni and Natalino Ronzitti (eds), War by Contract: Human Rights, 
Humanitarian Law, and Private Contractors (OUP, Oxford 2011) 431. 
191 Knut Ipsen, ’Combatants and non-combatants’ in Dieter Fleck (ed), The Handbook of International Humanitarian 
Law (Third Edition, OUP, Oxford 2013) 105. 
192 Giulio Bartolini, ’Private Military and Security Contractors as “Persons who Accompany the Armed Forces“’ in 
Francesco Francioni and Natalino Ronzitti (eds), War by Contract: Human Rights, Humanitarian Law, and Private 
Contractors (OUP, Oxford 2011) 233. 
	 	 32 
national legislation. In addition, in certain circumstances, PMSCs may be acting as State agents, or 
– in the case of private contractors hired by the UN – as UN agents, thus binding the private 
contractors directly to respect the human rights obligations of the hiring entity.193  
In addition to national legislations codifying human rights, Certain International human rights 
treaties express state parties obligations to ensure to all individuals subject to their jurisdiction the 
rights granted by the treaties. Under the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)194 for example, individuals must be “protected by the State, not just against violations of 
Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by private persons”195 making it 
irrelevant whether PMSCs act as private companies or as entities exercising state power. Similar 
observations can be made with respect to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR),196 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)197 and the American Convention on 
Human Rights (ACHR).198 However, the applicability of IHRL to PMSCs’ employees poses a 
series of problems, which shall be given some attention. Firstly, as PMSCs operate in unstable 
environments and often during situations amounting to an armed conflict, the scope of applicability 
of IHRL may be limited due to the clauses for derogation during national emergencies that many 
human rights treaties contain. However, in unstable environments not amounting to an armed 
conflict, i.e. the situation in which many PMSCs operate, IHRL is fully applicable. Secondly, as 
PMSCs usually operates abroad, the extraterritorial applicability of IHRL may pose some 
challenges. As concerns the extraterritorial application of international human rights treaties, the 
jurisprudence of several international judicial bodies has established throughout the years the basis 
for the territorial application of states’ human rights obligations abroad. In its advisory Opinion on 
the Palestina Wall case, the ICJ agreed with the constant practice of the Human Rights Committee 
in regard to the extraterritorial application of the ICCPR and extended its applicability to 
circumstances where a state is in a foreign territory in the exercise of its jurisdiction.199  In the 
Bankovic Case the ECHR held that the case-law of the Court had consistently demonstrated that the 																																																								
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Convention applies extraterritorially when the State has “effective control of the relevant territory 
and its inhabitants abroad … [and] exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be 
exercised by that Government”.200 In the Al-Skeini case the Court went further and established 
jurisdiction not based on authority and control over the area but on control over the individuals who 
were killed by acts of British soldiers.201  
In addition, PMSCs’ activities may be suited to generating the responsibility of the states 
concerned. It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the positive and negative human rights 
obligations of the states; it suffice to say that States have a threefold responsibility towards their 
international law obligations: to respect, protect and fulfill human rights202 and that hiring states as 
well as host states and even home states have several obligations in this regard.  
When hired directly by the UN, PMSCs’ obligations might originate from the human rights 
obligations of the Organization. While – as discussed above – the issue of IHRL application to UN 
peacekeeping operations is fairly controversial, the UN clearly accepts that it has human rights 
obligations in the context of peace operations.203 In certain cases, private conduct is deemed to 
count as state conduct because the private actor has been authorized by the state entity to exercise 
governmental powers204 or because the state has instructed, controlled or directed the private 
conduct.205 In the same manner, PMSCs’ conduct might be well considered as UN’s conduct when 
it is attributable to the Organization. A PMSC might be regarded as an agent of the UN, thereby 
being bound by the obligations of the Organization. In the Reparation case the ICJ declared that an 
agent can be “any person who, whether paid official or not, and whether permanently employed or 
not, has been charged by an organ of the Organization with carrying out, or helping to carry out, 
one of its functions – in short, any person through whom it acts”.206 This definition appears very 
broad and could include PMSCs. However, in contrast to this definition, the UN General Conditions 
of Contracts for Services stipulate that the contractor’s personnel “shall have the legal status of an 
independent contractor vis-à-vis the United Nations, and nothing contained in or relating to the 
Contract shall be construed as establishing or creating between the Parties the relationship of 
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employer and employee or of principal and agent”.207 Against this backdrop, the UN International 
Law Commission has nonetheless been clear, stating that the definition of the term “agent” is based 
on the passage of the advisory opinion of the Reparation case cited above and should “cover all the 
entities through whom the organization acts”208 Thus, PMSCs’ could be well deemed UN agents in 
certain circumstances. 
The major shortcoming in the case of attribution of PMSCs’ conduct to the UN is the limited 
capacity of the Organization to enforce its human rights obligations. As the UN is not able to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction itself, when human rights abuses take place, the exercise of criminal 
jurisdiction is a matter of the host State or the State of nationality of the contractor in the event that 
such State has extended its jurisdiction to cover the particular case. The position of the UN on 
individual criminal accountability of the private contractors hired by the Organization has been that 
the involvement of the UN is limited to the cooperation “with national authorities to ensure criminal 
accountability”.209 
 
C. Accountability of the corporation for unlawful PMSCs’ conduct 
 
It is beyond of the scope of this paper to analyze the corporate accountability of PMSCs in the event 
of human rights violations; it suffices to briefly sketch the current framework and to note the 
shortcomings. While corporations are not directly bound by IHL or IHRL, the implementation of 
human rights standards by states in their national legislation ensures their respect. Unfortunately, 
the majority of domestic regulations do not address the extraterritorial use of PMSCs – with the 
notable exception of South Africa and the US210 – thus strongly limiting the effectiveness of 
controls.211 However, PMSCs fall within the scope of the rapidly evolving international actions 
attempting to address the accountability and responsibility of business actors for human rights 
violations. Besides industry-specific responses that will be addressed below, these initiatives 
include the OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational Corporations and the UN’s Global Compact, 
trying to increase human rights due diligence obligations, corporate compliance with IHRL and 																																																								
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corporate accountability for human rights obligations. Despite laudable, these instruments share a 
voluntary, non-binding nature, do not offer enforceable mechanisms for protecting human rights 
and do not provide for enforceable remedies for those who have suffered human rights violations, 
making them unsuitable to ensure proper accountability of PMSCs’ conduct yet.212. 
 
D. National laws 
 
Mindful of the fact that the host state will frequently lack the capacity to control PMSCs’ 
conduct, several states have attempted to regulate the conduct of PMSCs operating from their 
countries, with various degrees of success. Among them are some of the key exporting states, such 
as the United States – arguably also the most loyal PMSCs’ client in the world – and South Africa, 
home to one of the best-known PMSC in history: the now defunct Executive Outcomes (EO).  
Precisely as a result of the frustrations that the governments experienced with EO and other 
PMSCs employing ex Apartheid military personnel, South Africa has made one of the most direct 
attempts to regulate the industry in 1998, by enacting the Foreign Military Assistance Act 
(FMA).213 The act is very comprehensive and encompasses a variety of military and military-related 
services, covering every activity in this regard performed by any natural person who is a citizen, a 
permanent resident or operating from within the country and all juristic persons registered or 
incorporated in South Africa. In an effort to obtain the greatest coverage, the FMA tackled the issue 
of PMSCs without trying to define the actors involved, but instead by regulating their activities. 
Therefore, even the most modern services provided by PMSCs are being contemplated. The FMA 
also provides for a licensing system which is composed of two steps: before entering into a contract 
with the client, the individual or the company is first required to obtain a license to offer the 
services and subsequently one to carry out these services. 
The United States has a similar approach to the regulation of PMSCs as they regulate private 
security companies based on their activities and not on the definition of the actors. However, the US 
did not dedicate a separate code to PMSCs. Their activities are subject to the International Traffic in 
Arms Regulation (ITAR) that regulates both the export of defense-related articles (weapons and 
military equipment) and the services related thereto. Interestingly, unlike the FMA in South Africa, 
ITAR does not regulate the services performed by PMSCs to their own government, leaving 
therefore the US government essentially exempt from the regulation. By excluding the US 																																																								
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government, ITAR has tremendously lost its efficacy in controlling the activities of PMSCs as the 
US is one of the most loyal clients on the market, as the Iraqi war has showed. The two-step 
licensing system provided by ITAR is similar to the one contained in the FMA. This system, 
however, is very complicated and both the companies involved and independent observers are not 
clear about the way the whole process works, since different offices and procedures are involved 
depending on the type of contract.214 More importantly, the main shortcoming of ITAR is the weak 
parliamentary oversight: the US congress is informed by the State Department ahead of granting a 
license only if the contracts is worth more than USD 50 million and, once the company has received 
the license, for the whole duration of the contract there are no oversight or reporting 
requirements.215 The threshold of additional scrutiny is thus easily avoidable by breaking up the 
contract into smaller segments. Besides ITAR, several other statutes originally thought for military 
personnel have been extended to apply to US contractors, providing jurisdiction for criminal 
offenses such as torture or murder. To give just a few examples: the Military Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Act of 2000 or the Uniform Code of Military Justice.  
Despite FMA and ITAR being correctly considered a step in the right direction and a substantial 
improvement if compared to what has been done at the international level, national legislation 
suffers from at least three major intrinsic obstacles that precludes it from becoming the key long-
term solution to the issues posed by the PMSCs.216 First: PMSCs operate on a global scale, and 
usually have a relatively limited fixed infrastructure. Therefore, they enjoy a high degree of 
mobility, enabling them to transfer their offices into any country in the world that offers a more 
PMSC-friendly regulation. Second: the necessary means to monitor PMSCs activities on a national 
level are often insufficient and the political will to do so is lacking. For instance, in comparison to 
most Western states, South African Civil Society is much more limited in its capacity to oversee the 
activities of local PMSCs as a consequence of the secrecy that covered defence and security issues 
under the former apartheid regime.217 But the difficulties concern even the most developed states. 
The US for example has expressed reluctance in pursuing American PMSCs involved in incidents 
or abuses. In 1998, an American PMSC supporting the Colombian government in its battle against 
the rebels by means of aerial surveillance, coordinated an airstrike on a village suspected to be a 
rebel stronghold, killing eighteen civilians, nine of whom were children. In relation to the 																																																								
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investigation that followed, a State Department Official of the embassy in Bogota was quoted 
stating “Our job is to protect Americans, not investigate Americans”.218 More recently however, for 
what concerns the US, it seems that the government has shifted its approach in order to face the 
private contractors’ impunity that marked the first part of the Iraqi war. In fact the legal regime that 
allowed immunity to PMSCs’ staff in Iraq has been repealed in 2009 and has been replaced by a 
SOFA that do not allow the private contractors to elude local jurisdiction. 
 
E. Soft Law 
 
Over the past years, some innovative instruments and organizations intended to regulate PMSCs 
have emerged at the international level, such as the Montreux Document, the International Code of 
Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC) and its Association (ICoCA). While directed 
at different actors, they all share the objective of enhancing PMSCs compliance with applicable 
rules of IHRL and IHL. 
In 2008, 17 States supported the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security 
Companies219 as a result of the tireless efforts in the course of an international process initiated by 
the Swiss Government and the International Committee of the Rec Cross (ICRC). The input that 
ultimately encouraged the involved parties to address this regrettable situation is attributable to the 
fact that, up until then, there were virtually no comprehensive codifications as to PMSCs’ conduct. 
Although a total of 54 States has now joined the document220 – which encompasses all relevant 
international legal norms and good practice for governments serving as home, contracting or 
territorial states to PMSCs as regards international humanitarian law and international human rights 
protection in the context of armed conflicts – none of its provisions is considered legally binding or 
directly enforceable. Against this backdrop and as a general remark, it shall nevertheless be 
emphasized that its scope is indeed fairly limited, focussing on armed conflicts and expressly not 
covering pre- and post- conflict environments,221 where PMSCs are mostly deployed.  
In 2010, in the wake of the Montreux Document, the Swiss Government launched a new 																																																								
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initiative aimed at regulating and monitoring PMSCs’ conduct through the creation of the 
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers (ICoC), certainly the most extensively 
supported code of conduct for PMSCs with some 700 private companies as signatories.222 The ICoC 
outlines core human rights principles and sets out policy and management rules for companies, 
including vetting and training of personnel, weapon management and grievance procedures.223 The 
code has a much broader scope of application than the Montreux Document: it applies to PMSCs 
involved in providing security services in “complex environments”,224 whereby these “Complex 
environments” also include areas experiencing or recovering from unrest or instability, not only due 
to armed conflicts but also to natural disasters.225 However, when the ICoC was created, it neither 
provided for an independent governance and oversight mechanism nor a complementary complaint 
system – that was created by the ICoCA only at the end of 2016 – enabling PMSCs to sign it and 
benefit from its good publicity yet virtually avoiding every control of their conduct.  
In this sense the creation in 2013 of the ICoC Association has been crucial in promoting, 
managing and overseeing the implementation of the code. The association’s remit includes the 
certification of PMSCs as to their conformity to the code’s requirements, reporting, monitoring and 
assessing PMSCs’ performance as well as handling complaints on alleged violation by its 
members.226 Its final aim is to establish commonly-agreed principles for PMSCs by means of the 
constitution of a foundation with a view of integrate them into recognized standards and 
guaranteeing their concretization in governance and oversight mechanisms.227 The ICoC issued a 
number of commitments that its signatories are bound to respect, inter alia the respect of 
humanitarian law, the protection of human rights, the interdiction to benefit from the prohibition to 
contract with, support or service governments or entities contrary to the UN Security Council’s 
sanctions228and the explicit prohibition from benefiting or engaging in any form of sexual 
exploitation, human trafficking and forced labour.229 In addition to the above, signatory companies 
are expected to implement the Code by incorporating its provisions in their own regulations and 
internal control and compliance management systems fostering the development of an appropriate 
apparatus to undertake strict selections and vetting processes of their personnel whilst not 																																																								
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neglecting to maintain the same ambitious standard when subcontracting such tasks.230 The ICoC’s 
three-pillared structure struck a balance between the differing views of the numerous actors 
involved, i.e. governments, private security industry representatives and civil society. Some among 
them expressed their criticisms as to these initiatives and self-regulations in general, arguing that 
they are mere indications of the failure of the concerned parties to establish formal regulation231 and 
should thus be considered as the “lowest-common-denominator legislation”.232 In this regard, States 
have a shared responsibility marked by their incapacity to take action by agreeing to an 
international convention. Even though it is accurate to assume that the self-regulation of PMSCs 
was driven by a desire to rebalance their lack of legitimacy, these are merely small steps in the right 
direction, culminated with the establishment of the ICoCA which intensifies and structures the 
regulations, setting up a multi-stakeholder governance framework pursuant to which the industry 
will be subject to a monitoring system and to a complaint procedure open to victims of any 
wrongdoing.233 
 
F. UN Policies, Guidelines and Agreements 
 
1. The new UN Guidelines  
 
Regrettably, the increased reliance on the PMSCs’ services by the UN has not been accompanied 
by a comparable move forward in policies and procedures regarding their employment. Precisely 
the lack of coordination and the absence of dedicated guidelines were pointed out by the UN 
Working Group on the use of Mercenaries in several of its reports.234 Until 2012 for example, each 
agency, fund and office contracted PMSCs on its own, applying its own standards and did not 
communicate its activities to the rest of the UN entities.235 The only general standard at UN level 
was contained in one of the Annexes to the UN Field Security Handbook, requiring the contracted 
companies to be insured and licensed to provide armed guards and identifying as the ultimate goal 
the indemnification of the UN from any sort of claims.236 The UN Working Group recommended 																																																								
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the Organization to establish effective selection and vetting systems and specific guidelines to 
regulate and monitor PMSCs’ activities when employed by the UN.237 Following the Working 
Group’s recommendations, in 2012 the UN DSS issued a series of documents attempting to 
implement the much-needed coherence and standardization for the performance of security services 
to the UN. As a matter of fact, the DSS’s system is comprised of four elements. First, the “UN 
Security Management System (UNSMS) Policy Manual”,238 containing a section dedicated to 
armed private security companies and setting out general policies for outsourcing armed security to 
PMSCs by UN agencies, programmes and funds, specifying that this practice may be considered 
“only when there is no possible provision of adequate and appropriate armed security from the host 
Government, alternate Member State(s), or internal United Nations system resources”.239 Moreover, 
the Policy Manual contains a number of requirements that the PMSCs need to fulfill in order to be 
contracted by the UN. These requirements are further specified in the second element of the system: 
the “Guidelines on the Use of Armed Security Services from Private Security Companies”,240 of the 
UNSMS Security Management Operations Manual, covering two types of security services, i.e. 
static and mobile protection, and providing for a set of mandatory requirements for PMSCs, 
involving a minimum five years experience providing armed security services, a valid license in 
their incorporation state, a license to carry and use weapons in the host state, the ability to comply 
with the scope of work, and ICoC membership.241 Lastly, the Guidelines and the Policy Manual are 
complemented by the other two elements: a very detailed “Model Contract for the provision of 
armed security services”242 and a “Statement of Works for the Use of Armed Private Security 
Companies”243 containing specific advices on the content of the final contract between the company 
and the hiring entity.  
Aware of the risk of having different members of the UN family applying the guidelines in a 
different manner, the system provides for a chain of accountability requiring the Under-Secretary-
General for Safety and Security to approve every use of PMSCs by the UN. Despite being a 
significant advancement over the old standards of outsourcing, the expert panel convened in 2013 
by the UN Working Group, identified several gaps and areas of improvement, including the lack of 
vetting of security contractors by the UN and the absence of an oversight mechanism to hold 																																																								
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PMSCs accountable for violations committed by their personnel while hired by the UN.244 Despite 
being invited to join the panel, unfortunately the UN DSS refused to participate, showing a split 
within the UN itself on the very issue.245  
 
2. The UN Status of Forces Agreement  
 
Before deploying a peacekeeping operation, the host country and the Troops Contributing 
Country (TCC) usually negotiate the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), codifying the immunity 
of the peacekeepers deployed. The privileges and immunities are usually extended to the operation 
as a whole, its property and its members,246 establishing unique immunities for the peacekeepers.247 
The UN Model SOFA codifies complete immunity for actions performed by UN personnel in their 
official capacity, delegating the exclusive jurisdiction over military personnel in respect of any 
criminal offences to their respective participating states.248 Until 2009, when a new SOFA between 
the Iraqi government and the US entered into force, similar provisions granted immunity from Iraqi 
law to private contractors operating in the country.249 The UN Model SOFA however does not 
include any reference to PMSCs in its provisions and does not extend the immunity from local 
jurisdiction to private contractors employed by the UN250. Nonetheless, recent SOFAs included 
particular provisions addressed to private contractors who enjoyed a number of facilitations in 
relation to obtaining visas, exemption from taxes and duties on particular goods and freedom of 
movement.251 These privileges however do not include any immunity from local jurisdiction, 
therefore subjecting contractors to the laws of the host State. 
 
The current UN system regulating PMSCs hired by the Organization is deficient in many aspects 
and is not suitable for a comprehensive control of private partners providing security services. The 
next section will examine precisely these aspects in light of the proposed private RRF.  																																																								
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PART III: The creation of a Private UN Rapid Reaction Force  
 
The privatization of an operation’s armed forces or part of them is arguably the most 
controversial scenario as to the PMSCs’ role within future UN peace operations. In 2003, Singer 
argued that there were three ways for this to happen:252 first, PMSCs providing private protection to 
convoys and personnel on the ground. Second: a private Rapid-Reaction Force (RRF) could be 
constituted to be at the disposal of the mission shall a more “muscular” approach be deemed 
necessary. Third: the UN could temporarily outsource a peace operation in its entirety. 
While the first option is now a consolidated reality – PMSCs are in fact routinely hired to 
provide armed escorts for convoys and VIPs – the second and third have not been yet implemented, 
but are increasingly being considered.253 As previously mentioned, the UN is being increasingly 
asked by its Member States to perform multi-faceted missions and at the same time its forces are 
being deployed into more volatile environments. Within these complex multi-dimensional missions, 
soldiers with specialized capabilities are needed to perform the most various tasks in fulfilling their 
mandate. However, the countries with the most advanced armies in the world which maintain these 
capabilities, including but not limited to the United States, the UK, Germany, France and Japan, 
merely contribute with less than 3% of the more than 100’000 uniformed personnel deployed in 
peacekeeping operations at the time of writing.254 Due to major failures, which catalyzed public 
attention in the 1990s, many Western countries became reluctant when placing their soldiers under 
UN command thereby preferring to operate through alternative channels, such as the ad hoc 
coalitions established in Iraq or most recently in Syria.255 This implies that the difficulties the UN 
experiences in getting sufficient troops and an adequate equipment as well as a sound logistical 
support are constantly growing.256 Unfortunately, peacekeepers from developing countries often 
arrive onto the field ill-trained and ill-equipped257 and tend to prove to be incapable of coping with 
routine violence, hampering the effectiveness of the missions.258 The inherent difficulties of multi-																																																								
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national missions such as for instance soldiers coming from different countries and backgrounds 
operating based on incongruous military doctrines and policies, using the most divergent 
communication systems and experiencing difficulties due to a difference in language further 
compound these challenges, leaving multi-dimensional operations suffer serious quantitative and 
qualitative deficiencies.259  
In addition of not having the ideal force at its disposal, the U.N. continues to struggle to mobilize 
the necessary troops as promptly as each specific situation requires.260 Recalling the UN inaction 
against the genocide that took place in Rwanda in 1994, former Secretary General Kofi Annan 
expressed his frustration based on the fact that according to General Dallaire, the commander of the 
UN Mission, a small force of 5’000 troops could have saved 500’000 lives.261 The lack of a prompt 
response capability was later evidenced in the 2015 Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on 
Peace Operations identifying slow deployment as “one of the greatest impediments to more 
effective peace operations”.262  
To address this problem, the Report recommended the establishment of a “small United Nations 
‘vanguard’ capability” and the creation by the Secretariat of a “small dedicated regional strategic 
reserve contingent” to serve as vanguard for new missions.263 By the same token, the Report 
suggested that such contingents be formed redeploying peacekeepers from other missions or by 
tapping into existing regional troops such as the E.U. Battlegroups and the African Standby 
Force.264 The Report however failed to tackle the problem of political reluctance that developed 
countries showed in providing the necessary forces. In order to avoid the political component, many 
authors favour a robust rapid-reaction capability mechanism thanks to PMSCs’ engagement.265 
Even Kofi Annan confessed he had considered the possibility of a PMSC engagement for the 
terribly needed rapid reaction in the Rwandan refugee camp of Goma, but the plan was not ripe for 
being implemented at that time.266  
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The UN could use this capability to address two of the above illustrated issues it is facing, first 
by means of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) which could intervene immediately after the adoption of 
a SC resolution establishing a peace operation and before political consensus is reached as regards 
the contributing countries.267 Second: a RRF could provide the necessary strength and reinforce an 
existing peace operation.268 Such a rapid reaction force could resemble the composition of the 
Intervention Brigade in Congo and would provide the UN with the ability of responding to threats 
in a swift and much faster manner, avoiding an escalation of violence while creating a more stable 
environment for the multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation that would follow. In addition, the 
private RRF would not suffer from the issues that the command and control structures utilized 
during peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations have evidenced. Indeed, these structures 
have been largely ad hoc, lacked uniformity, and thus failed to provide a clear role of the UN in the 
direction and conduction of the operations, leading to potentially conflicting division of 
responsibility between the UN and the TCC.269 Traditional peacekeeping operations suffer because 
of their multi-national aspect: the soldiers on the ground do not usually respond directly to UN 
authorities but report to their national commanders. While carrying out their tasks, the troops stay in 
their state’s service but are additionally given the status of international personnel under the 
authority of the UN as well.270 This dual nature is highly problematic. The commanders of the 
operation are assigned by UN organs and only take orders from these, but to control the troops, their 
orders are not issued directly but need to pass through the national commanders of the single 
contingents. 271  Sometimes, the national contingent commanders seek approval from their 
governments before implementing the orders of the operation commander, resulting in delays and 
orders that may be the result of negotiations between the governments.272 This lack of clear and 
centralized top-down objectives results in being a material problem in light of the situation in which 
these forces operate.273 For this very reason, PMSCs may be more effective since they could 
provide the UN with a centralized command structure, streamlining and integrating the command 																																																								
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over the troops – as exemplified in the case of Executive Outcome’s commander in Sierra Leone, 
who enjoyed unified command over all the troops274– thereby obviously increasing the RRF’s 
efficiency.275  
 
A. Intervention of the RRF prior to the actual deployment of a UN peace 
operation 
 
The first method thanks to which the private sector could try to help UN peace operations to 
succeed is very far-reaching and aims to solve the most criticized point in the context of 
peacekeeping, i.e. the delay that often occurs between a Security Council resolution and the actual 
deployment of the forces. Traditional peacekeeping operations take an average of six months to be 
placed where there is a need for their protection,276 i.e. far more than the recommended periods of 
30 days for traditional mission and 90 days for complex missions contained in the Brahimi 
Report.277 Mindful of the words of General Dallaire, commander of the UN Mission in Rwanda, 
rapidity in deployment can save thousands of lives. The PMSCs could be deployed much faster, 
engaging with the opposing parties at the outset of the acts of violence (and not after six months as 
regular peacekeepers) avoiding an escalation of the conflict, setting up the necessary infrastructure 
and creating a more stable environment in view of handing over the responsibility to the UN 
operation once the political consensus has been reached. During Rwanda crisis, this idea did began 
to grow not only at the UN but was spreading and being discussed within the US federal 
government as well, where it was suggested to hire EO to create a humanitarian corridor for the 
fleeing Rwandan Hutu refugee. Yet when the question of who shall have paid the bill was raised, 
the whole project was abandoned.278  
On that very occasion, the industry assured to be ready to carry out the task. Executive Outcomes 
– for instance – performed a business assessment trying to evaluate their potential capacity to 
intervene in Rwanda in 1994. Once finalised, the company affirmed it had the capability to be on 
the ground with armed men within 14 days and to deploy 1’500 troops backed by air and fire 
support within six weeks to react to the genocide. It also stated that its six-months’ planned 
operation would have had a cost of USD 150 million, a minor expense if compared to the UN 																																																								
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operation UNAMIR II which was in action after the genocide at a cost of around USD 3 million a 
day.279 For its operations, EO would have issued so-called “security islands” to provide safe 
heavens for thousands of refugees.280 Its Rapid Deployment Brigade would have been rooted in 
three Rapid Deployment battalions for peace enforcement of 375 men each, a support battalion of 
311 men for disaster relief, an Air wing consisting of an aircraft for surveillance, combat helicopters 
and two Boeings 727 for troop transportation.281 Interestingly, EO’s Rapid Deployment Brigade 
resembles, though in smaller scale, the composition of the UN Intervention Brigade. 
 
B. Intervention of the Rapid Reaction Force within existing peace operations 
 
While Genser and Garvie proposed an RRF that would primarily operate independently from a 
UN peace operation and would in fact hand over the control of the area when the mission has been 
deployed, 282  the same RRF could serve to address another long-standing problem of the 
Organization: the incapacity of UN peace operations to pursue their mandate effectively in violent 
environments.  
The UN is confronted with extreme environments that demand a more coercive and aggressive 
approach. Unfortunately, blue helmets are usually unable or unwilling to provide it,283 such as in the 
case of the UN peace operation in Congo. There, the UN Security Council recognized the lack of 
progress that the cycle of violence in the eastern DRC was causing and decided to expand the 
mandate of the mission by establishing the Intervention Brigade. The Brigade was created 
following a series of recommendations contained in a Special Report284 of the Secretary-General 
and was given an unprecedented mandate to prevent the expansion of, neutralize and disarm armed 
rebel groups285 by carrying out “targeted offensive operations, either on its own or jointly with 
FARDC [Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo]”.286 In order to carry out and 
support Congolese government offensive operations forces, the Brigade was staffed with 3096 
troops and equipped with attack helicopters, long-range artillery, armoured personnel carriers, 
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special forces and snipers.287 Created in March 2013, the Brigade was dispatched in Congo only 
after several months, in July/August 2013, but immediately began fighting alongside FARDC 
against the rebel group M23.288 Thanks to the massive support of the Brigade, M23 – the strongest 
armed group in the country – was defeated in a few months and in the beginning of 2014 the 
Congolese forces and the Brigade focussed on other armed opposition forces.289 Over the past few 
years the Intervention Brigade has been widely hailed as a success leading to positive military 
results through the support of national troops in a way that MONUSCO was unable to do. However, 
while the result of the Brigade may be welcomed, MONUSCO was struggling to contrast the rebel 
groups since years and the SC did not provide the mission with the necessary tools to counterattack. 
In fact, a strong military unit in support of the operation in Congo had already been proposed a 
decade before instituting the Brigade. Ten years prior to the establishment of the Brigade, the 
International Peace Operations Association (IPOA),290 aware of the challenges MONUC was facing 
in Congo, issued a Concept Paper presenting how the industry was ready to provide the mission 
with the necessary services that lacked to fulfill its mandate.291 The IPOA Consortium, composed of 
well-known PMSCs such as PAE, MPRI and AirScan International, would have provided security 
and stabilization services (including but not limited to protecting civilians, UN personnel and 
deterring or interdicting armed factions undermining the UN mandate) humanitarian services (by 
providing mission security for humanitarian operations on the ground and by undertaking demining 
processes) and support to the NGOs (by establishing communications services and a 24-hour rapid 
rescue service).292 It was estimated that the forces could have been deployed within 30 to 90 days 
and that the cost of the operation would have been only a fraction of what the UN would have had 
to pay for a similar operation if implemented through state forces.293 The private sector was not 
unfamiliar to similar efforts: in 1993, notwithstanding the presence of the United Nations Angola 
Verification Mission II (UNAVEMII), the Angolan government, struggling to fight the rebels of the 
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), hired EO to recover the territory 
captured by UNITA and to train the Angolan army.294 EO was able to deploy incredibly quickly, 																																																								
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beginning its operations after less than one month of signing the first contract with the government, 
295 and conducted classic find, fix and destroy operations against the rebels. 296 In addition, EO 
acted as “force multiplier”, building up on Angolan national troops and providing the necessary 
skills backed with the contractor’s broad military experience.297 In spite of being present in the 
territory with only around 550 men, EO succeeded in securing the entire oil region of Angola and 
the diamond producing areas, fighting along of, and operationally commanding the Forcas Armadas 
Angolanas (the Angolan Army, hereinafter “FAA”).298 At the same time, the company retrained the 
16th Brigade of the FAA, making it able to inflict heavy losses upon UNITA and counter it.299  
Although some critics overstate EO’s success in Angola, it has to be underlined at this point that 
the company played a fundamental role in the Angolan conflict, providing the national army with 
the necessary expertise and exploiting its knowledge of UNITA’s weaknesses.300 More generally, 
EO’s operation in Angola has proven the industry’s ability to quickly mobilize a small unit of 
contractors and execute a precise mandate in a very effective manner.  
 
Having outlined the two methods by which the private sector could help the UN in facing the 
challenges that modern peacekeeping has presented, the next part of this paper will examine the 
political and legal challenges that a private RRF would pose to the Organization. 
 
C. Who decides? The Current system for PMSCs’ selection and the RRF  
 
Before 2012, each agency, department and entity of the UN had independently adopted its own 
position as concerns the use of PMSCs’ services as the Organization lacked the necessary 
overarching coordination and coherence for such a delicate action. One of the aims of the UN 
Guidelines on the use of armed security services was precisely to clarify the chain of accountability 
for decisions related to the use of PMSCs for armed security.301 Under the new Guidelines the final 																																																								
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decision on the use of private armed security rests with the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and 
Security.302  Despite eventually codifying a terribly needed chain of accountability, as some 
representatives of UN Staff Union reported, the current mechanism is complicated and multi-
layered and therefore undermines individual accountability by involving various officials in the 
process.303 This problematic system should not be implemented in the context of the RRF as the 
decision of its deployment would have to be taken promptly, and not after the lengthy process 
described above.  Furthermore, while the decision on the use of PMSCs is taken by the Under-
Secretary General of the DSS, the selection of the PMSC takes place at the operational level: each 
UN operation and entity has the authority to choose which PMSC will provide the services.304  
Given the unique nature of a private RRF, its level of authority and its independence on the field, 
it goes without saying that such a mechanism cannot be used for the decision as to which companies 
will provide the forces for the RRF. The entity authorizing both the RRF and the establishment of 
the peacekeeping force should always be the Security Council, the UN body vested with the 
authority to take the necessary actions to ensure global peace and stability. However if the actor 
deciding on the specific PMSC that would provide the troops for the RRF would be the SC as well, 
there is a risk that the most developed states would try to influence the process in order to secure the 
award of a contract to PMSCs incorporated in their territory and that the whole process would 
collapse in front of a deadlock among SC members over the PMSC’s nationality of incorporation. 
In order to avoid this, the decision should be ideally taken at the operational level, by an entity 
without any political motivation. Unfortunately, this solution is very unlikely to be concretized 
precisely because of the political implications that the PMSC’s choice would have.  
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D. Legal challenges 
 
1. A private Rapid Reaction Force under International Humanitarian Law 
 
a) The applicability of International Humanitarian Law to UN forces 
 
UN forces taking part in peace operations are placed under UN command and control and are 
thus considered to be an integral part of the institutional apparatus of the Organization, forming one 
of its subsidiary organs. Peacekeeping forces are composed of national contingents that pursuant to 
the “effective control” doctrine305 renders their acts directly attributable to the UN, thereby 
triggering the UN’s international responsibility.306 While most scholars share this position and hold 
that the “effective control” shall apply to determine institutional responsibility, some have argued 
that as the circumstance of peace operations are significantly different from those of state 
responsibility, the threshold should be adjusted accordingly. Due to the particular nature of the 
command structure of peace operations, it is unrealistic to expect the UN to exercise “effective 
control” over every aspect of the operation.307 Thus, also when considering the attribution of acts of 
PMSCs to the UN the lack of this complete control should not be a bar to imputing responsibility308 
and therefore their conduct should be attributable to the Organization in the event that they are 
under its “overall control”,309 a less stringent standard according to which the State (or in this case 
the UN) is responsible for the conduct of the persons acting, on whatever basis, on its behalf.310A 
private RRF would, as described before, be created by a SC Resolution and would be put under the 
authority and command of the Security Council, leading the latter and the whole UN to be 
accountable for the acts of the former. However, before addressing the practical legal obligations 
deriving form IHL to which the RRF would be subject, it is mandatory to set out a few key points 
with reference to the legal obligations of the UN itself. 
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In the past, the UN and its Member States have shown reluctance as to IHL’s applicability to the 
actions of their forces when engaged in peace operations.311 It has been pointed out that for the sake 
of their international legitimacy, peacekeeping forces had to be impartial, objective, neutral and 
concerned only with the maintenance of international peace and security and therefore cannot and 
should not be considered as a party to the conflict.312 The same arguments have been put forward in 
recent years by some TCCs participating in the NATO operation in Libya313 and even by the 
Secretary-General in regard to the UN intervention in Côte d’Ivoire in 2011.314 Furthermore, some 
authors suggested that in light of the international legitimacy under which UN operations are 
conducted, the conditions triggering IHL’s applicability might be different for UN forces.315 The 
arguments in favour of a different IHL application to UN forces when they are pursuing an 
internationally supported “legitimate goal” must be strongly rejected. The distinction that some 
authors are trying to put forward is in clear conflict with the raison d’être of IHL, which tries to 
impose limits on the freedom of action of the belligerents, regardless of the cause for which they 
fight. The argument raises the following issues: are the rules governing relations between 
belligerents (jus in bello) autonomous, or is their application conditioned by the rules prohibiting 
the recourse to force (jus ad bellum)? On this issue scholarly analysis argues for the complete 
autonomy of jus in bello with regard to jus ad bellum and the consistent state practice confirms this 
conclusion.316 The Preamble of the Additional Protocol I supports this autonomy:  
 
The High Contracting Parties ...  
Reaffirming further that the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 
and of this Protocol must be fully applied in all circumstances to all persons who are 
protected by those instruments, without any adverse distinction based on the nature or 
origin of the armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or attributed to the Parties to 																																																								
311 See Tristan Ferraro, ’The applicability and application of international humanitarian law to multinational forces’ 
(2013) 95 Int’lRRC 561, 563. 
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Mujezinović Larsen, Camilla Gundahl Cooper and Gro Nystuen (eds), Searching for a “Principle of Humanity” in 
International Humanitarian Law (First Paperback Edition, CambUP, Cambridge 2012) 259. The author refers to a 
statement by the Norwegian prime minister to the effect that Norwegian soldiers could not be considered legitimate 
targets while participating in NATO operations in Libya, because they were on a UN mission.  
314 After two UN attack helicopters fired missiles at a military camp controlled by the defeated presidential candidate 
Laurent Gbagbo, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon was quoted saying: "Let me emphasise that UNOCI is not a 
party to the conflict. In line with its Security Council mandate, the mission has taken this action in self defence and to 
protect civilians." See Patrick Worsnip, ‘Ban Ki-moon says U.N. not party to I. Coast conflict’ Reuters (4 April 2011) 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/uk-ivorycoast-un-ban-idUKTRE73364Z20110404> accessed 23 November 2016. 
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the conflict...317  
 
Irrespective of the fact that the UN is defending a just cause, if the conditions of IHL are met, its 
rules will immediately apply to UN forces taking part in the conflict.  
However, as the UN is not party to any treaty stipulating IHL rights and obligations – including 
the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols – the Organization is technically not bound 
by them. Per contra, as the International Court of Justice correctly noted in its advisory opinion to 
the Reparation Case, the UN is “a subject of international law and capable of possessing 
international rights and duties”,318 including those stemming from customary international law.319 
The question therefore does not concern the application of IHL itself to the UN, but rather the scope 
of the UN’s obligations under customary international law. To clarify the matter, in 1999 the UN 
Secretary-General issued an internal instruction titled “Observance by United Nations forces of 
international humanitarian law”, commonly referred as “the Bulletin”. 320  It articulates the 
“fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law applicable to United Nations 
forces conducting operations under United Nations command and control”.321 The provisions 
contained therein do not constitute an exhaustive list of the IHL principles and rules binding for 
military personnel, but set forth several obligations,322 specifying that “The fundamental principles 
and rules of international humanitarian law set out in the present bulletin are applicable to United 
Nations forces when in situations of armed conflict they are actively engaged therein as combatants, 
to the extent and for the duration of their engagement”323 and that they “are accordingly applicable 
in enforcement actions, or in peacekeeping operations when the use of force is permitted in self-
defence”.324 In addition to the Bulletin, the Model SOFA contains relevant obligations in respect to 
IHL. Despite not being contemplated in the Model SOFA, contemporary SOFAs since the UN 
Mission in Rwanda325 further specify the obligations of UN forces, stating that peacekeeping 
operations are to be conducted “with full respect for the principles and rules of the international 
conventions applicable to the conduct of military personnel”, 326 including “the four Geneva 																																																								
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Conventions of 12 August 1949, and their Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977…”.327 The relevant 
principles of IHL are therefore being incorporated into the Rules of Engagement (RoE) of the forces 
on the ground and have to be applied when the conditions are met.  
A different argument against the application of IHL to the UN is that it does not have a criminal 
justice system by which it could try and punish persons responsible for war crimes and could 
therefore not theoretically undertake certain essential steps to ensure compliance by its forces with 
IHL.328 In fact, the wording of Art. 1 common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions is clear on this 
regard and states that “The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for 
the present Convention in all circumstances”.329 Similarly, Rule 139 of Customary IHL requires that 
“Each party to the conflict must respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law by its 
armed forces and other persons or groups acting in fact on its instructions, or under its direction or 
control”.330 Since the standard peacekeeping operations mechanism relies upon Member States’ 
contributions, this obligation usually lies within the various TCCs as they are delegated the task of 
sanctioning any violation.331 The obligation of the UN in this sense is therefore maintained. 
 
b) Status and obligations of UN-hired RRFs’ employees 
 
After having ascertained that UN forces are subject to IHL, in order to define the particular legal 
obligations of a private RRF it is necessary to analyze the status of the UN-hired RRFs’ private 
contractors. Since the private RRF would be engaged in situations of armed conflicts and would be 
placed under the command and authority of the UN, PMSCs’ employees should be granted the 
status of combatants which, under Art. 43 (2) of the first Additional Protocol and Art. 4 (A) of the 
third Geneva Convention, is determined by membership in the armed forces or membership in 
militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces, which are under a command 
responsible to that party for the conduct of its subordinates. In light of the obligation to guarantee 																																																																																																																																																																																								
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respect of IHL the establishment of the RRF could represent a considerable issue. As stated above, 
the UN does not have a centralized criminal justice system and discharge the obligations to ensure 
compliance with IHL by the troops to the TCCs. This would not be the case with the RRF, since it 
would be directly hired by the UN. In order to achieve an effective enforcement of IHL in this case, 
the jurisdictional authority should be either retained by the states involved or exercised by the UN 
itself through the establishment of a comprehensive criminal justice regime. In addition to this, the 
establishment of such a system would solve many of the political and legal problems in relation to 
peacekeeping operations as concerns to the impunity of PMSCs’ employees and of peacekeepers.  
The creation and practicability of this system will be discussed in the section dedicated to the 
RRF’s accountability. 
In international armed conflicts, RRF’s employees will be lawful targets of attack and could 
potentially be detained by their adversaries as prisoners of war. Likewise, RRF’s personnel subject 
to capture and detainment would be entitled to the protections of the Third Geneva Convention. By 
virtue of the combatant status that could be granted to the contractors, RRF’s employees would be 
required to afford the protections laid down in Art. 3 of the Geneva Convention to all persons not 
participating in the conflict and in particular to any non-government force having “laid down its 
arms” or who is considered hors de combat, refraining from perpetrating violence, murder, torture 
and affording them the necessary judicial guarantees.332 Additionally, same as the Intervention 
Brigade, in the event of a non-international armed conflict the RRF would be subject to the 
provisions of international humanitarian law applying to NIAC and the provisions of customary 
international law, including the requirement to distinguish between civilians and combatants when 
targeting attacks, 333 the prohibition of “methods and means of warfare calculated to inflict 
unnecessary suffering”334 and perfidy.335 Finally, the RRF would need to ensure that its staff abide 
by the principles contained in the Secretary-General‘s Bulletin, including the protection of civilian 
populations from attack,336 the prohibitions and restrictions on the use of certain weapons and 
methods of combat,337 the prohibition of attacking monuments, archaeological sites and places of 																																																								
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worship and objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population,338 and other specific 
requirements regarding the treatment of persons hors de combat, detainees and wounded.339  
 
2. Immunities and IHL 
 
UN peacekeepers benefit from legal protections against attacks under various legal regimes, 
including the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel,340 the Optional 
Protocol thereto341 and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.342 Members of private 
RRFs could fall under the personal protection field of these rules and thus be granted immunity 
from attacks. Indeed, the Safety Convention applies to all the “persons engaged or deployed (…) as 
members of the military, police or civilian components of a United Nations operation”343 and 
requires state parties to ensure – inter alia – that UN personnel, their equipment and premises are 
not made the object of attack,344 and that intentional attacks against them or threats to commit such 
attacks are criminalized.345 The convention further provides for criminal penalties in case of attacks 
against peacekeepers and establishes a system of universal jurisdiction over these attacks.346 It is not 
hard to see that there is an inherent incompatibility between the Safety Convention and IHL. 
Whereas under the convention peacekeepers (and in this case RRF’s private contractors) cannot be 
attacked, the latter are considered combatants pursuant to IHL and accordingly they are not 
protected against attacks and other combatants cannot be punished for attacking them.347 
Aware of this possibility, the drafters of the Safety Convention included an IHL-related 
exception: indeed, according to Art. 2, the protections afforded to peacekeepers do not apply “to a 
UN operation authorized by the Security Council as an enforcement action under Chapter VII (of 
the UN Charter) in which any of the personnel are engaged as combatants against organized armed 
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15 January 1999) 2051 UNTS 363. 
341 UNGA ‘Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel’ (6 January 
2006) UN Doc A/Res/60/42. 
342 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 
90 (Rome Statute). 
343 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel (adopted 9 December 1994, entered into force 
15 January 1999) 2051 UNTS 363, Art. 1(a)(i).  
344 Ibid Art. 7(1). 
345 Ibid Art. 9(1). 
346 Ibid Art. 9–10. 
347 See Marco Sassoli, ‘International Humanitarian Law and Peace Operations, Scope of Application Ratione Materiae’ 
in G L Beruto (ed), International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights and Peace Operations: Conference Proceedings, 
31st Round Table on Current Problems of International Humanitarian Law (San Remo 4–6 September 2008) 102. 
	 	 56 
forces and to which the law of international armed conflicts applies”.348 Thus, in the case in which 
the RRF would be deployed pursuing an enforcement mandate under Chapter VII in the context of 
an International Armed Conflict, these immunities would not be granted. What however if the RRF 
is assigned to the same mandate, but within a NIAC? The exact interplay between IHL and the 
Safety Convention on this issue still remains unclear. The Safety Convention’s text and drafting 
history suggest that the peacekeepers should lose their protection only in case of an international 
armed conflict. Art. 2 of the Safety Convention refers only to international armed conflicts. A 
contrario this means the immunities would be granted to a RRF operating in a NIAC and it would 
therefore still be a crime to attack UN-associated personnel. This interpretation is also consistent 
with the will of the Convention’s drafters, that – mindful of the UN experiences in Somalia – 
wanted to protect UN personnel in the event of their capture, given the poor protection granted by 
the legal status of captured soldiers in non international conflicts compared with the prisoners of 
war status accorded in the case of international conflicts.349 However, at the time of the drafting of 
the Safety Convention, it was not foreseen that the UN could engage in peace enforcement in 
NIAC.350 A more logical interpretation for the Safety Convention in today’s context would be to 
exclude the protection both in IAC and in NIAC. Of the same opinion is the ICRC, that has been 
unmistakeably clear on this very issue. According to Mr. Kellenberger, its former president, the 
immunities and protections conferred to peace-operations personnel – both in international and non-
international conflicts – must not prejudice IHL’s fundamental principle of equality between 
belligerents, conferring equal rights and duties to both sides of an armed conflict.351 Similarly, the 
definition of “war crimes” contained in the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
includes attacks against peacekeepers “as long as they are entitled to the protection given to 
civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict.”352    
 
 
 
 																																																								
348 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel (adopted 9 December 1994, entered into force 
15 January 1999) 2051 UNTS 363, Art. 2.  
349 Ola Engdahl, ‘The legal status of United Nations and associated personnel in peace operations and the legal regime 
protecting them’ in G L Beruto (ed), International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights and Peace Operations: 
Conference Proceedings, 31st Round Table on Current Problems of International Humanitarian Law (San Remo 4–6 
September 2008) 129. 
350 Scott Sheeran and Stephanie Case, ‘The Intervention Brigade: Legal Issues for the UN in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo’ (International Peace Institute, New York 2014) 11.	
351 Jakob Kellenberger, ‘Keynote address’ in G L Beruto (ed), International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights and 
Peace Operations: Conference Proceedings, 31st Round Table on Current Problems of International Humanitarian Law 
(San Remo 4–6 September 2008) 36.  
352 Art. 8 (2)(b)(iii) and (e)(iii) of the Rome Statute. 
	 	 57 
3. A private Rapid Reaction Force under International Human Rights Law 
 
As discussed above, PMSCs’ employees could be bound by the UN’s human rights obligations 
were they be considered as “agents” of the Organization. As the RRF would – as shown above – 
operate under a SC Resolution and be mandate by the very SC similarly as peacekeeping forces, its 
actions would be imputable to the Organization in the same way; as the United Nations Legal 
Counsel stated: “an act of a peacekeeping force is, in principle, imputable to the Organization”.353 
 
After having outlined the legal framework under which the RRF would operate, the next sections 
describes the elements that would be necessary for the implementation of an effective regulatory 
scheme for the RFF by the UN, starting with the creation of a new licensing process for PMSCs, 
outlining the main element that the model Contract for the RRF should incorporate and finally 
describing the monitoring system in place and the necessary improvements.  
 
4. Licensing 
 
a) Licensing system under the current UN Guidelines  
 
The current selection process of the UN maintains a list of private companies licensed as “UN 
Secretariat Registered Vendors” that are eligible to contract with UN bodies.354 This screening 
allows the UN to identify and eliminate from consideration companies that are under formal 
investigation, are suspended from or have been sanctioned by the UN or employ any former UN 
staff member who has dealt with the company in an official capacity.355 Besides, the companies are 
required to ratify the UN Supplier Code of Conduct, addressing key issues of labour, human rights, 
protection of the environment and ethical conduct and requiring the adherence to the values 
enshrined in the UN Charter.356 In order to be able to bid for the provision of services to the UN, 
private military and security companies are also required to be members of the International Code 
of Conduct, to count on five-years of experience at least in providing armed services, to be 																																																								
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currently licensed for providing these services in their “home state”, i.e. the place of registration or 
incorporation, to be currently licensed to engage as a PMSC and to import, carry and use firearms in 
the host state, i.e. where the UN requires them to operate.357 PMSCs also need to conduct a 
screening of their personnel with regard to criminal convictions, encompassing any breach of 
international criminal or humanitarian law in order to confirm that the employees delivering the 
services for the UN offer regular trainings to personnel and staff with respect to the Use of Force 
Policy, the International Code of Conduct, human rights law in general and the prevention of sexual 
harassment.358 In relation to the use of force and weapons, the PMSC is required to develop and 
implement its own Use of Force Policy, firearms and management procedures and “Weapons 
Manual” that need to be consistent with the national law of the place where the services are 
provided, with the ICoC and, to the extent possible, with the UN “Use of Force Policy” and the 
“UNDSS Manual of Instruction on Use of Force Equipment, including Firearms”.359 In this regard, 
the PMSC’s Policies need to be at least as restrictive as the UN Policies themselves. 
These procedures are a big step in the right direction and result in an improved system as 
compared than the one in place before 2012. This situation is however not flawless. The personnel 
screening process is limited to police and military services of the contractor’s current country of 
residence, employment and nationality. Private contractors operate around the world and tend to be 
deployed in several countries during their carrier, and not only where they live, where their 
employer is incorporated or where they were born. The current vetting system leaves therefore the 
acts of private contractors performed outside these three countries outside its scope of control. 
Furthermore, the background check merely covers the past five years,360 neglecting virtually 
everything that the contractor has done before that time.  In addition, the guidelines did not 
established internal comprehensive procedures for the selection and vetting of PMSCs and their 
personnel. Instead, they outsourced it to the governing body of the ICoC, the International Code of 
Conduct Association.361 The system outlined above does not provide for a satisfactory control for 
armed security, and would definitely not be suitable for the RRF. 
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b) A new licensing system necessary for the Rapid Reaction Force 
 
The standards for the selection of a PMSC maintained by the UN for armed services are being 
criticized both by UN entities362 and independent observers.363 A Rapid Reaction Force such as the 
one proposed here would need to be held to a much higher standard than the one applied to PMSCs 
providing “simple” armed security. The new licensing system would need to aim at obtaining a list 
of PMSCs ready to provide the UN, in a matter of weeks, with an operative unit composed of 
highly trained troops and fitted with the necessary vehicles, aircrafts and necessary equipment. 
Therefore, language abilities, trainings of soldiers, and the effective capacity of the company to 
supply the military apparatus for such a force, should be the primary focus of the process to 
efficiently provide for a ready-to-deploy unit. The UN should thus elaborate a new set of guidelines 
and policies that would apply only in the case of PMSCs serving as a Rapid Reaction Force. This 
“Peacekeeping Code”364 shall mandate for a high level of experience and competence in the specific 
sector of “robust” peacekeeping, i.e. through police and military capabilities. Given the unique 
mandate of the RRF, the current Use of Force Policy and the Weapons Manual should be adjusted 
to the needs of the tasks. While the current PMSCs’ policies and manuals are designed to regulate 
and supervise PMSCs’ defensive behaviours, they would need to change dramatically in order to 
adequately guide and control the conduct of the private contractors in the field of an offensive 
military operation. 
 
5. Equipment 
 
In order to assume the tasks of a RRF, PMSCs would need to demonstrate to own or to be able to 
provide the means necessary to carry it out despite its magnitude, i.e. heavy armoured vehicles, 
aircraft carriers, heavy artillery and helicopters. Although numerous PMSCs have claimed more 
than once throughout the years that they can supply their clients with such instruments, they usually 
resort to the governments of the countries in which they are operating to obtain them or they 
purchase or lease them on an ad hoc basis.365 As the RRF would deploy in highly unstable areas, 
with weak or even absent governmental structures it shall nevertheless not be concealed that in such 																																																								
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situations, promptly obtaining the necessary vehicles or aircrafts – by the government or by private 
dealers – could prove very difficult and detrimental to the rapidity in which the private RRF would 
be able to mobilize its forces on the field.  
 
6. Vetting 
 
Although PMSCs are naturally required to adequately vet and train the personnel that would be 
employed by the UN, both the screening itself and the project supervision by the Organization are 
being considered as too limited, with a lax oversight by the UN.366 As noted by the Working Group, 
the Guidelines do not establish comprehensive internal procedures for the selection and vetting of 
PMSCs.367 Instead, they overly rely on auto-certification and self-reporting, requiring the company 
to confirm in writing that it has conducted the screening and that only the personnel meeting the 
guidelines’ standards will be engaged,368 and to certify that each contractor has undergone the 
training, thereby demonstrating the necessary level of skills.369 This kind of vetting process is 
definitely not adequate for screening the private RRF personnel. The firms recruit their staff first 
and foremost according to their preferences and needs, with little to no consideration to their 
background, and sometimes even their training.370 Moreover, although language differences have 
been highlighted as one of the substantial difficulties that multinational peacekeeping operations 
have to tackle,371 language barriers have proven to be a significant hurdle when assembling PMSCs’ 
contingents as well. A US State Department audit of an American PMSC tasked with protecting the 
US embassy in Baghdad, Triple Canopy, highlighted severe language difficulties among its 
personnel, noting how the Spanish-speaking Peruvian supervisors were unable to communicate 
effectively with their Ugandan staff. 372  This situation would be further exacerbated by the 
considerable size of the RRF if compared to PMSCs’ units that usually consist in troops in the low-
hundreds. Furthermore, the UN currently only considers the conduct of the personnel to be hired 
under the specific contract, instead of the whole roaster of the company. On this subject, the 
Montreux Document includes references to the PMSC’s past conduct and the one of its personnel as 
well as the respect of the company for the welfare of its employees, thus expanding the scope of the 																																																								
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assessment and therefore amounting to a better judgment over the potential contractual partner.373 It 
goes without saying that the new vetting process would need to implement similar provisions. 
The lax oversight of the UN on the PMSCs’ vetting process is somehow balanced by the fact that 
the Guidelines outsource many of the elements of control to the governing body of the ICoC, the 
International Code of Conduct Association.374 After its establishment, the ICoCA instituted an 
oversight mechanism assessing and certifying whether PMSCs meet the requirements listed in the 
ICoC. While such an initiative should be welcomed, a further analysis of the control apparatus of 
the Association reveals that it is not a viable alternative to the establishment by the UN of internal 
comprehensive procedures for the selection and vetting of PMSCs. While the ICoCA is indeed in 
charge of certifying that the systems and policies by member Companies of the Association meet 
the Code’s principles and standards, it is worth noting that only one sixth of the more than 700 
signatories of the ICoC have actually become ICoCA members, leaving the rest virtually outside of 
the Association’s reach. In addition, the ICoCA certification process operates in a manner that is 
complementary to, and not duplicative of, certification under existing recognized national and 
international standards.375 This means that the Board defines the certification requirements based on 
national or international standards that are consistent with the ICoC and accepts requests for ICoCA 
certification based on these standards.376 The company can obtain the certification from a private 
audit company that has to be accredited by a national accreditation body member of the 
International Accreditation Forum (IAF). This multi-layered system has become a not negligible 
cause of concern. While some national certification bodies work in close cooperation human rights 
specialists and competent auditors, others do not.377 Hence, some PMSCs could be held to higher 
standards than others. In addition, the PMSC itself, once it has picked a standard, sets the scope for 
the certification that includes various boundaries, including but not limited to geographic ones.378 
As a result, a company conducting several contracts in different locations may apply for 
certification limited to a specific area. 379  While the implementation of the ICoCA and its 
certification procedures is still in process and its effectiveness still can prove itself, these limitations 																																																								
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make the ICoCA an unsuitable partner for certification in the case of a private UN RRF. 
Consequently, as the UN Working Group pointed out, the ICoC Association could complement, but 
clearly not replace the role of the UN in such a critical task.380  
In order to achieve the goal of a short list of capable, efficient, and human-rights sound 
companies that could send a RRF on the ground on behalf of the UN, the latter should thus expand 
the scope of the current Guidelines and replace the auto-certification process with a UN-led 
screening process, granting the independence and objectivity that the current system dramatically 
lacks of. 
 
7. Contractual relationships between the RRF and the UN  
 
As noted above, PMSCs’ accountability depends very much on how their contractual 
relationship with the hiring entity is structured. Each UN agency and organization wishing to 
contract PMSCs’ services need to use the mandatory UN model contract previewed by the Security 
Management Operations Manual.381 This model contract reports as contractual obligations the same 
requirements provided as selection criteria by the Guidelines, in particular the elements concerning 
the personnel training, the Use of Force Policy, the Firearms Management procedures and the 
Weapons Manual.382 The UN Guidelines at present only cover the possibility of contracting with 
private companies for stationary protection of UN personnel, premises and property and for mobile 
protection of UN personnel and property, with the express objective of providing a visible deterrent 
and an armed response to repel any attack.383 The present system is therefore not suitable for the 
mandate that a RRF would be asked to perform. It is necessary to create a new model contract that 
would need just some minor adjustments depending on the specific context in which the RRF 
would be deployed and the mandate contained in the SC Resolution. Using the current model 
contract as a base, it would be necessary to implement several specific instruments and provisions, 
whereby existing instruments of the UN framework, Member States’ good practice and the soft law 
instruments described above should be of great help. 
 
a) Respect for Human rights  																																																								
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After CACI contractors were implicated in the notorious case of torture and abuses at Abu 
Ghraib, the US government not only failed to terminate its contract with the company, but even 
expanded its terms.384 In view of the reluctance of hiring entities to terminate their contracts with 
PMSCs in the case of human rights violations, the model contract for the RRF should include 
specific provisions articulating the circumstances in which the UN could and shall take back control 
over the RRF depending on the degree and severity of failure to observe both International Human 
Rights Law and Humanitarian Law.385 Such graduated and segmented takeover provisions would 
allow the UN to avoid the difficult decision to terminate the contract. Moreover, the model contract 
should contain the terms under which the engagement could be extended or terminated in view of 
the performances of the PMSCs.  
In addition, as a way of promoting human rights law and humanitarian law and to foster PMSC’s 
compliance, the contract should include “securities or bonds for contractual performance”386, 
“financial rewards or penalties and incentives”387 and “opportunities to compete for additional 
contracts388 as suggested in the Montreux Document.  
 
b) Rules of Engagement  
 
In principle, the rules of engagement (RoE) for the RRF should adopt elements of traditional 
RoE used by Member States’ regular armies, thus focusing on war-fighting rather than 
peacekeeping. Applying a clearer and more structured concept – such as the use of force against 
“hostile forces” instead of the use of force in response to “hostile acts” or “hostile intent” of armed 
groups against the mission or its mandate – allow for less interpretation from the side of the soldiers 
on the field and their officers, thus increasing their compliance and decreasing the possibility of 
incidents due to ambiguity.389 Unfortunately, the RoE of the Intervention Brigade are not publicly 																																																								
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available, but according to some unconfirmed suggestions there might be in fact only one set of 
RoE for both the Brigade and the regular forces engaged in MONUSCO.390 This should not be the 
case in the event of an RRF employed within a pre-existing UN operation. The RRF RoE would be 
largely based on the mandate of the SC, which would set the objectives and the means by which 
they should be reached. Assuming that the RRF would engage in a similar context in which the 
Intervention Brigade is now operating, the RoE of the RRF should provide the forces on the ground 
with the necessary flexibility to adjust their targets depending on the situation. This would 
inevitably include giving the RRF the responsibility to take strategic and operational decisions, 
including the addressee targeted by its attacks. The more the mandate is precise, the more restricted 
is the room for manoeuvre – and thus error – for the RRF. However, having too strict RoE would in 
turn hamper the company’s effectiveness on the battlefield, endangering the mandate itself and the 
entire UN mission in the event the RRF is acting within an existing peace operation. 
 
c) Subcontracting and replacement  
 
The issue of subcontracting would be of utmost importance in the case of a private RRF. A light 
approach on this point could carry the risk of a domino effect, with the prime contractor delegating 
its responsibilities, weakening the chain of command and thus the single contractor’s accountability 
and jeopardizing the entire operation. 391  The UN Model Contract contains a provision on 
subcontracting in its General Conditions: subcontracting is permitted, first on the condition that the 
UN may review the qualification of the subcontractor and is entitled to reject it if it considers it not 
qualified, and second that the subcontract is in accordance with the terms and conditions of the 
main contract.392 In addition, the rejection or the removal of any subcontractor is not deemed to 
entitle the prime Contractor to claim any denials of performances.393 The same standard should 
apply in respect to subcontracting tasks of the RRF, with additionally precautions build in the 
contract, such as the precondition that the subcontractor should also be part of the restricted pool of 
PMSCs in the list mentioned above in order to avoid that the companies that could not meet the 
requirements of the licensing programme could participate in the RRF anyway.  
The replacement of personnel by the contractor is explicitly enshrined in Art. 9.5 of the Model 
Contract, forbidding any replacement or withdrawal without prior consent of the UN and stipulating 																																																								
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391 Emmylou Boddy, Anna Marie Burdzy and Nelleke Van Amstel, ‘Putting Private Security Regulation into Practice: 
Sharing Good Practices on Procurement and Contracting 2015–2016’ (Public-Private Partnership Series, DCAF, 
Geneva 2016) 28.  
392 UNDSS, Guidelines on the Use of Armed Security Services from Private Security Companies (2012) Annex B – 
Model Contract, Annex A, Section 5.  
393 Ibid.	
	 	 65 
that the new contractor needs to be fully licensed and certified, properly trained and hold the 
qualifications and competencies as laid down in the main Contract.394 As an additional safeguard, 
the contract stipulated with the PMSC for the provision of troops for the RRF should specifically 
foresee that the replacement has to be subject to the same rigorous vetting process as the personnel 
provided through the main contract.  
 
d) Identification of the personnel on the ground  
 
In order to allow for greater accountability, it is crucial that the single contractor is recognizable 
in the course of the mandate’s performance. In the current model contract, all personnel are required 
to display UN issued identification within the premises of the UN.395 The model contract for the 
RRF should additionally require the PMSC’s personnel to be identifiable when they are carrying 
out activities related to the mandate and to be clearly distinguishable from the public authorities of 
the State in which they are operating, provided that this is consistent with the force protection 
requirements and the safety of the personnel.396  
 
The model contract would be adjusted for the particular context within which the RRF would be 
mobilized and then be signed by the involved parties. The contract would report the duration of the 
engagement and its specific objectives authorized by the SC Resolution. The Contract should 
finally contain performance benchmarks as specific as possible, bearing in mind that by its very 
nature, the RRF should, and would, adapt to the changing context of the battlefield.  
 
8. Monitoring RRFs’ performance and ensuring its accountability 
 
The UK is highly optimistic about the monitoring of UN-contracted PMSCs. In 2002, arguing 
for a wider role of private contractors in UN missions, the UK government set forth that in fact, 
“[t]here would also be no difficulty in monitoring the performance and behaviour of a PMC 
employed by the UN”.397 This opinion was however far from reality at the time of its submission in 
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2002 and is still so today. As illustrated before, the UN surely faces several challenges trying to 
monitor PMSCs. 
 
a) Monitoring 
 
Once engaged by the UN, PMSCs providing armed security services are subject to the authority 
and direction of the appropriate UN entity. PMSCs are subject to regular oversight and review by a 
Contracting Officer in the duty station where their services are provided with the aim of ensuring 
that the terms of the Contract are thoroughly respected.398 The companies are subject to daily399 and 
monthly on-site reviews,400 including the UN’s evaluation of the company’s performance, control 
of the contract implementation and control of the personnel’s compliance with the applicable 
standard of conduct.401 This includes the ICoC, applicable national and international laws, the 
provisions on sexual exploitation and abuse by the employees and measures concerning child 
labour.402 Despite the indisputable benefits that the new Guidelines have brought to the UN 
contracting system, some have expressed their concerns noting that the level of monitoring is still 
insufficient.403 In fact, the UN Guidelines do not include any special provision on accountability for 
human rights abuses and the correlated effective remedies in case of violations. The lack of 
monitoring and oversight procedures, including in the event of human rights violations, has been 
pointed out even by entities within the UN itself.404 The PMSC is required to “commits itself to 
hold its employees accountable for any violations of the United Nations standards of conduct and to 
ensure referral for criminal prosecution of any actions which constitute criminal offences under the 
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laws of the host country”.405 This provision shifts the burden of accountability to the PMSC, 
leaving the UN passively waiting for the company to do its job of auto-supervising itself. In this 
case as well, the UN outsources the process, relying on the ICoC Association to conduct part of the 
monitoring. The division of tasks between the UN and the ICoCA on this issue is not completely 
clear, and it is significant that it was not until September 2016, when the general assembly of 
ICoCA has taken place, that the procedures for the Reporting, Monitoring and Assessing 
Performance were created and implemented. It is therefore too early to perform a comprehensive 
assessment of the system. However, an analysis of the procedures that have been accepted by the 
Genera Assembly reveals that it would probably not be suitable for the RRF’s monitoring. As set 
forth in its Articles of Association (AoA), the monitoring system is composed of self-assessment 
reports written by the companies operating in the field.406 In order to address potential issues or 
specific compliance concerns, the ICoCA Secretariat may enter into dialogue with the company, 
whereby the content of this discussion is supposed to remain confidential.407 Field-based monitoring 
is envisaged in the system but only when the review of available information or a human rights 
assessment has identified the need for a stringent monitoring or a member of the Association has 
requested so. 408  This monitoring system lacks the necessary uninterrupted presence on the 
battlefield from the monitoring officers and is therefore unsuitable for the peculiarities of a RRF. 
Confidential bilateral discussions between the PMSC and the ICoCA cannot replace an in-depth 
examination by UN officers of the potential issues and compliance concerns over the contract. 
Moreover, given the presumably short deployment of the RRF, irregular field-monitor would not 
insure the necessary supervision by an independent authority over the RRF’s actions. 
Such a hands-off approach by the UN is not satisfactory for the control or armed security and 
would definitely not be suitable in the case of a privatized RRF. The UN should therefore design a 
new monitoring programme dedicated to the RRF, including UN observers present on the field 
accompanying the private contractors along every operation to monitor their compliance with the 
terms of the contract. These officers should report to the UN directly and inform the command of 
any wrongful conduct of the PMSCs’ employees.  
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b) Accountability  
 
While according to the ICRC civil liability of PMSCs is generally accepted, their criminal 
responsibility is quite disputed.409 The companies themselves could potentially be sued in the states 
in which they are operating and provide for monetary compensations to the victims but the criminal 
responsibility of the firm itself is rare and limited in most states.410 Private contractors on the 
contrary can be held individually culpable for their abuses before the courts of the state where the 
crimes have occurred, the state of nationality of the contractor, any other state if the crime falls 
under universal jurisdiction or in front of the ICC in the case of severe breaches of humanitarian or 
human rights law. 
By being actively involved in an armed conflict, the private RRF would automatically enjoy 
unprecedented autonomy in the use of force. Such liberties need to be balanced and checked by a 
rigorous system of accountability. Under the current UN system, the Organization, the host country 
and the Troops Contributing Countries (TCCs) negotiate the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), 
codifying the legal protections that UN personnel should enjoy. As described above, privileges and 
immunities are usually extended to the operation’s property, its funds and assets as well as its 
members,411 and unique immunities are established for peacekeepers.412 The UN Model SOFA and 
every Status of Forces Agreement since ONUC provide for an exclusively criminal and disciplinary 
jurisdiction over military contingent by the TCCs.413 Unfortunately, TCCs have demonstrated to be 
reluctant in holding their troops accountable of alleged violations and thus the retention of exclusive 
criminal jurisdiction by the TCCs has often resulted in a situation of de facto impunity.414  
As stated above, recent SOFAs included particular facilities for private contractors but did not 
mention any immunity from local jurisdiction, therefore subjecting them to the laws of the host 
State. 415  In the case of a RRF composed exclusively of PMSCs personnel acting in fact as 
peacekeepers, the question arises as to their immunity under the SOFA. The immunity granted in 																																																								
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the Model SOFA would not provide for the necessary accountability: first because as previously 
pointed out, the countries or origin (TCCs) of the peacekeepers (or in this case of the private 
contractors) are often unwilling to prosecute their nationals, and second because in case of a private 
RRF the State in which the PMSC is incorporated may not even have jurisdiction over its 
employees since the companies often recruit from various countries around the world. To overcome 
this jurisdictional challenge, some scholars have suggested to amend the SOFA in order to grant 
jurisdiction to the home state of the company or the state of which the private contractor in question 
is a national,416 while others proposed to avoid the extension of immunity normally granted to the 
peacekeepers to the any other entity, thereby giving jurisdiction over the RRF to the host country 
and the country in which the PMSC is incorporated and at the same time introducing an arbitration 
mechanism into the SOFA to address breaches or crimes falling outside of the contractually 
approved mandate.417  
Despite the noble intent of diminishing private contractors’ impunity by not granting them any of 
the immunities enjoyed by “classic” peacekeepers, this path is simply not viable. It is without doubt 
that peacekeepers committing serious violations need to be brought in front of justice to respond for 
their crimes. However, soldiers are deployed in volatile environments and they cannot be held to the 
same standard as the one that applies in a normal situation. However, the immunity granted to 
PMSCs personnel should in any case be limited to the acts committed pursuant to the SC mandate, 
and do not cover any acts exceeding the authority granted by such mandate. In addition, the states in 
which the RRF would be deployed could be unable to provide for a functioning judicial system, 
which would understandably disappoint the public opinion with the perceived impunity that the 
RRF would enjoy. 
In order to avoid that the lack of political will to pursue private contractors violations leads to 
their impunity, the responsibility to administer the criminal justice system could be assumed by the 
UN itself. The peacekeeping mission would thus include a sort of “mobile court” within its system 
that would deploy where needed, i.e. where the RRF is active, in order to enhance direct witness 
accessibility and to enable a great deal of other advantages as to the collection of evidence.418 As 
affirmed by the ICTY in the Tadic case, the Security Council retains the competence to establish an 
international criminal tribunal to serve the Council’s principal function of maintaining and 
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guaranteeing international peace and security.419 Based on the aforementioned, the Security Council 
could de jure create a new criminal tribunal dedicated exclusively to the prosecution of RRF’s 
members. Along the creation of a court, the establishment a criminal justice system requires the 
implementation of a broad framework of auxiliary structures. First of all, the tribunal would need to 
apply military law and regulations promulgated by the UN itself that do not exist today and should 
therefore be enacted. The military law and regulations should be enforced by an administrative 
system, such as for instance a pool of military lawyers and a dedicated unit of UN military police 
composed, inter alia, of investigators and forensic technicians. As noted by Patterson, these 
positions should be filled by individually recruited civil servants rather than by contributions of 
Member States in order to avoid influences by the states trying to push their own agendas.420 
Finally, to complement the judicial system, the UN should count on a dedicated – temporary – 
penitentiary system in order to allow for greater independency from the host state and to respect 
international standards.   
 
E. Funding and costs of the RRF  
 
The hostile criticism, which is constantly directed against the costs of current peacekeeping 
operations, has naturally been reiterated towards the idea of a private RRF. Indeed, it is firmly 
believed that the private option could have the potential for a drastic decrease in administrative, 
training and insurance costs, thereby transforming peacekeeping into a cost-effective operation.421 
In a report for the US Senate, the US Committee on Appropriations noted that it was “aware that, in 
some cases, private companies can carry out effective peacekeeping missions for a fraction of the 
funding the United Nations requires to carry out the same mission”; further suggesting that the UN 
could “no longer afford to ignore the potential cost-savings that private companies with proven 
records of good services and good behaviour offer”.422 When discussing the costs and benefits of a 
private involvement in peacekeeping, the contrasting experience between UN peacekeeping 
operations and the involvement of Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone are the most cited 
examples.423 In 1995, the government of Sierra Leone, backed by large multinationals interested in 
the country’s natural resources, hired Executive Outcomes to help national troops in their battle 																																																								
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against the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), that had made significant military gains in the end 
of 1994, including overrunning the three most important mining sites of the country.424 Executive 
Outcomes deployed a battalion-sized unit of assault infantry and was able to evict the RUF from the 
peripheral district of Freetown, stabilise the diamond rich area and subsequently destroy the RUF 
headquarter within a couple of months, helping the government to reach the first tangible result 
since the beginning of the rebel war. The rebels were forced to sign a peace agreement, bringing the 
necessary stability to the region to hold the first election in over a decade.425 After the departure of 
EO in 1997 however, the war restarted and the UN was forced to intervene in 1999, setting up a 
large and complex mission that took several years to reach a result comparable to the stability 
brought by EO’s intervention.426 The assumption that PMSCs can carry out the same task for a 
fraction of a price is based on the total costs of these two operations. While EO’s presence in Sierra 
Leone lasted twenty-one months and cost the government an estimate of USD 35 Mio427 the UN 
peace force totalled more than USD 2.8 Billion costs for a 7 years operation.428 This staggering 
difference in the duration of the stay and its costs is further compounded by the means deployed on 
the ground by EO and the UN: EO deployed a total of some 350 men,429 while the UN mission in 
Sierra Leone at one point counted more than 11700 staff members.430 EO’s experience in Sierra 
Leone has been described as a success and has proved to be cost-effective and efficient in reaching 
the goals set up in the contract with the government. However, the authors praising the success of 
EO in Sierra Leone in comparison to the longer and more expensive UN Mission (UNAMSIL) tend 
to omit a series of factors that should be taken into account of when assessing these two particular 
missions. 
The UN force in Sierra Leone was larger for two reasons: first, in order to ensure permanent 
control, UN peacekeeping operations tend to entail the establishment of permanent outposts, 
inevitably inflating the number of troops necessary, but at the same time providing more stability. 
Second, EO did not only provide the government with direct combat actions, but acted in particular 
as force multipliers, providing training to government troops and local hunters and thus 
dramatically increasing their effectiveness on the battleground. 431  On the converse, UN 																																																								
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peacekeepers do not usually build up their mission on local troops, and that is the fundamental 
reason why their numbers are much higher. In addition, the two mandates were quite different: EO 
entered the conflict with a peace-enforcing mandate as that they came in with the objective of 
regaining control over some areas and destroying the RUF headquarter acting as the brain of the 
operations while using local forces as the body. By contrast, UNAMSIL was mandated to keep the 
peace dictated by the peace agreement and assist the government in a DDR plan. Comparing the 
two mandates in order to underline the cost-effectiveness of PMSCs is therefore misleading because 
it does not consider the inherent differences among them. The difference in size and scope of the 
mission has been material in regard to the financial costs that they gave rise to. While the UN 
mission has substantially been more expensive as a whole, median costs per personnel were 
considerably lower, i.e. around USD 1’500 per month,432 when compared with the median USD 
4’700 for each EO’s contractor. Furthermore, the official invoice of EO’s services, amounting to 
USD 35 Mio, does not represent the total gain of EO’s engagement in Sierra Leone seeing that the 
government allegedly agreed to grant broad and lucrative mining concessions in the Kono diamond 
fields as part of EO’s remuneration.433 In general, the price of the outsourcing contract does not 
cover all the expenses that the UN would incur. The hidden costs related to the use of PMSCs for 
the RRF would include the expenses resulting from the creation of the system described above, 
including the establishment of the judicial system, the draft of the new laws and regulation, 
screening and licensing costs, monitoring costs and sanctions costs. While the proponents of a 
private RRF do not usually take these costs into account, in order to conduct an informed discussion 
on the issue the UN definitely should. 
Finally it should be stressed that the present analysis is not meant to show that PMSCs are not 
efficient or cost-effective compared to UN regular peacekeepers. On the contrary, the experience of 
Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone illustrates that a private company accomplished to fulfil the 
agreed military objectives in a stunningly short period of time, allowing for a short-term increase in 
stability in the region. This is precisely the task that the RRF would be asked to carry out.  
 
F. Who pays the bill? 
 
Every consideration regarding the establishment of the private RRF has to face the question of 
its funding, although a private RRF is likely to cost less than an ad-hoc force made up of 																																																								
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contributions from the Member States. This has been correctly highlighted as one of the biggest 
setbacks of such a force.434 In the current system, while the establishment of the operation and the 
scope of the mandate are decided by the SC, the financing of peacekeeping operations is a shared 
responsibility of all UN Member States. As can be imagined, even though they are legally obliged 
to pay their respective share they tend not to be very compliant with this obligation. As of June 
2015, UN members owed nearly USD 4.8 billion in outstanding contributions to UN peacekeeping 
accounts.435 Needless to say that without the necessary materials and personnel, peacekeeping 
operations are destined to fail their objectives. In order not to loose precious time to reach an 
agreement on the funds necessary for every RRF operation, the UN would have to create a 
dedicated “RRF-fund” that after every deployment would have to be reconstituted. The key issue 
here will therefore consist in whether big contributors would draw sufficient political and 
economical benefits from early operations. In such case the next RRF should not incur particular 
difficulties of being financed.  
 
G. Are PMSCs ready for the job? 
 
While many commentators cites EO’s operations in Angola and Sierra Leone as examples for the 
creation of private RRF, they usually do not consider the major changes that the industry has 
experienced since Executive Outcomes was the key player. EO’s 2000-strong manpower pool was 
composed mostly of the former South African Defence Force’s special operation forces.436 They 
spoke the same language, operated under common operational structures, were trained by the same 
army, used the same equipment and were led into battle under pre-existing rank structures.437 While 
former special operation operatives are still very important for PMSCs, they usually hold 
managerial or training roles and tend to be deployed on the field only in rare circumstances, such as 
in the context of VIP protection.438  For the rest of their forces, PMSCs now prefer hiring locals. 
This is done for a number of reasons, including the opportunity to rely on local knowledge but also 
because of mere financial motives. To give an idea of the current scale, as of March 2011, of the 
approximately 90’000 contractors placed by the US government in Afghanistan, 46’000 were 
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locals, 24’000 were third-country nationals while only 20’000 were US citizens.439 Modern private 
forces therefore do not show the same features that the well-established units of EO did back in the 
1990s and thus their claims that they can provide with a “clearer chain of command, more readily 
compatible military equipment and training, and greater experience of working together than do ad 
hoc multinational forces”,440 are not necessarily of great significance nowadays. 
Additionally, while a private RRF would not be considered a large force in terms of involved 
personnel by any national army’s point of view, PMSCs do not usually work in such large numbers. 
EO’s presence in Angola amounted to 550 soldiers, whereas in Sierra Leone it was only made of a 
staff of 350 people. For these reasons, it could prove very difficult to form, over a few weeks, a 
troop of 2’000-3’000 units meeting the stringent requirements put forward by the licensing and 
contractual system articulated above. 
Finally, while some proponents of a private RRF have highlighted the offensive capabilities of 
PMSCs, the industry itself – oddly enough – seems to become quite oriented towards a defensive 
approach. This is done primarily to distance itself from mercenaries, who apply violence 
offensively, whereas PMSCs conduct their operations in a reactive manner.441 In Iraq, for example, 
despite the rise of the insurgent threat, ArmorGroup declined the opportunity to increase its 
firepower because “[a]s a publicly traded company, they didn’t want to be perceived as a mercenary 
force”.442 
Despite the industry’s promises of its readiness to provide the UN with a RRF,443 it appears that 
the private sector should implement some changes – above all a return to the combative approach 
that marked the sector in the 80s and 90s – before PMSCs become active in the offensive 
application of violence for the UN.  
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Conclusion 
	
 
UN peacekeeping is constantly confronted with difficulties of qualitative and quantitative nature 
and pro-PMSCs arguments continue to have currency. The cost-effectiveness and flexibility that the 
private sector seems to offer are tempting and several actors argue for an increased involvement of 
PMSCs in peace operations. The UN’s use of PMSCs’ throughout the last decades has granted the 
companies with political and practical influence on peacekeeping operations and has not been 
matched by a significant control over their activities by the Organization, that still relies on auto-
certification by the PMSCs and outsource some of the critical tasks of its oversight mechanism to 
external entities.  
In light of this background, the creation of the UN Rapid Reaction Force staffed with private 
contractors on the one hand seems to be the logical next step within the evolution of PMSCs’ 
involvement in UN operations, but on the other hand its conduct could easily elude the control of 
the Organization. As this paper has argued, although the private security industry does employ 
highly trained and capable individuals, the companies do not often possess the necessary collective 
abilities to carry out peace operations as stressed by some. Under present circumstances, the PMSC 
industry will have to face quite a challenge in responding as efficiently as Executive Outcomes did 
in its Africa operation. The company’s ability to adopt an offensive approach in its operations, as 
done in the context of the Angolan and Sierra Leone civil war, cannot be found in modern PMSCs. 
However, as the industry is highly adaptable and could therefore change its approach to respond to 
the needs of the UN, this paper mainly focuses on the issues the UN would have to consider if and 
when contracting PMSCs for “robust” peacekeeping. The UN should apply some major adjustments 
in order to establish a control system enabling the organization to (i) have at its disposal a pool of 
highly capable PMSCs with proven records regarding human rights respect (ii) monitor the RRF’s 
activities when it is deployed on the ground (iii) hold private contractors accountable for any 
eventual criminal conduct and (iv) terminate its contract with the RRF in the event of failures in 
meeting the established objectives.  
While it would be possible to ensure that the RRF-operations are conducted in respect of UN 
standards in regard of IHL and IHRL, through the deployment of such a force the international 
community would outsource one of its fundamental duties. Aside from the technical challenges that 
such an endeavour would represent, the UN and its Member States should therefore seriously ask 
themselves if while drafting the Charter, its Founders had contemplated contract-forces and if it is 
not possible to find a political consensus over a more rapid deployment of traditional peace 
operations composed of Member States contributions. Furthermore, the RRF risks to be held 
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hostage by the Security Council in the event of conflicting agendas among its members, 
significantly hampering its effectiveness. Nonetheless, in light of the humanitarian crises that have 
not been addressed in a prompt manner over the years, the creation of the RRF could indeed 
represent a temporary solution, provided that it is timely and adequately funded and that while the 
Security Council is in charge of the establishment and the mandate of the RRF, the operational 
choices (first of all the choice of the PMSC) are left to other UN entities. While the RRF is far from 
embodying the ideal instrument by which the UN could ensure peace and stability around the 
world, the reality is that in the future, as the industry transforms itself and as the UN establishes the 
necessary oversight, it could well fit the Organization’s needs. 
  
	 	 77 
Bibliography 			
 
AVANT D, ‘Privatizing Military Training’ (2002) 7 (6) FPIF 1 
BARNETT A and HUGES S, ‘British firm accused in UN “sex scandal”’ Guardian (London 29 July 
2001) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/jul/29/unitednations> accessed 2 December 
2016 
BARTOLINI G, ’Private Military and Security Contractors as “Persons who Accompany the Armed 
Forces“’ in Francesco Francioni and Natalino Ronzitti (eds), War by Contract: Human Rights, 
Humanitarian Law, and Private Contractors (OUP, Oxford 2011) 
BEAUMONT P, ‘Abu Ghraib abuse firms are rewarded’ Guardian (London 16 January 2005) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jan/16/usa.iraq> accessed 18 November 2016 
BELLAMY A J and WILLIAMS P D, ‘Broadening the Base of United Nations Troop- and Police-
Contributing Countries: Providing For Peacekeeping’ (Providing for Peacekeeping, 
International Peace Institute New York 2012)  
BERMAN P, ‘When Does Violence Cross the Armed Conflict Threshold? Current Dilemmas’ in 
Proceedings of the 13th Bruges Colloquium: Scope of Application of International 
Humanitarian Law (18–19 October 2012) 
BODDY E, BURDZY A M and VAN AMSTEL N, ‘Putting Private Security Regulation into Practice: 
Sharing Good Practices on Procurement and Contracting 2015 – 2016’ (Public-Private 
Partnership Series, DCAF, Geneva 2016)  
BRINKLEY J and GLANZ J, ‘Contract Workers Implicated in February Army Report on Prison Abuse 
Remain on the Job’ NewYorkTimes (New York 4 May 2004) 
 <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/04/world/struggle-for-iraq-civilian-employees-contract-
workers-implicated-february-army.html> accessed 2 December 2016 
BROOKS D, ‘Protecting people: The PMC potential: Comments and suggestions for the UK Green 
Paper on regulating private military services’ (25 July 2002) 4  
 <http://www.hoosier84.com/0725brookspmcregs.pdf> accessed 25 November 2016 
BUIGNION F, ’Just wars, wars of aggression and international humanitarian law’ (2002) 86 Int’lRRC 
523 
BURKE R, ‘Status of Forces Deployed on UN Peacekeeping Operations: Jurisdictional Immunity’ 
(2011) 16 JCSL 63 
BUZATU A-M, Towards an International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers: A View 
from Inside a Multistakeholder Process (SSR Paper 12, DCAF, Geneva 2015) 
CAMERON, ’Private military companies: their status under international humanitarian law and ist 
impact on regulation’ (2006) 88 Int’lRRC 573 
CAPARINI M, ‘Domestic regulation: licensing regimes for the export of military goods and services’ 
	 	 78 
in Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt (eds), From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and 
Regulation of Private Military Companies (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007) 
CASSESE A, Cassese’s International Criminal Law (Third Edition, Oxford Unversity Press, Oxford 
2013) 
CHATTERJEE P, ’Darfur Diplomacy: Enter the Contractors’ (21 October 2004) 
<www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=11598> accessed 11 November 2016 
CLEARY S, ‘Angola - A case study of private military involvement’ in Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy 
Mason (eds), Peace, Profit or Plunder? The Privatisation of Security in War-Torn African 
Societies (Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa 1999) 
COBAIN I and QUINN B, ‘How US firms profited from torture flights’ Guardian (London 31 August 
2011) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/31/us-firms-torture-flights-rendition> 
accessed 08 November 2016 
COCKAYNE J, ‘Commercial Security in Humanitarian and Post Conflict Settings – An Explorative 
Study’ (International Peace Academy, New York 2006)  
DAVENPORT C, ‘U.S. Appeals Court reinstates Abu Ghraib prison abuse case against CACI’ 
WashingtonPost (21 October 2016) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/us-
appeals-court-reinstates-abu-ghraib-prison-abuse-case-against-caci/2016/10/21/e53c43a6-
97b5-11e6-bc79-af1cd3d2984b_story.html> accessed 18 November 2016 
DIU N L, ‘What the UN Doesn’t Want You To Know’ Telegraph (London 6 February 2012) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/film/9041974/What-the-UN-Doesnt-Want-You-to-
Know.html> accessed 2 December 2016 
DICKINSGON L A, ‘Contract as a Tool for Regulating Private Military Companies’ in Simon 
Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt (eds), From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation 
of Private Military Companies (OUP, Oxford 2007) 
DOSWALD-BECK L, ‘Private military companies under international humanitarian law’, in S. 
Chesterman and C. Lehnardt (eds), From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of 
Private Military Companies (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007) 
EMMANUELLI C, ‘Les forces des Nations Unies et le droit international humanitaire’ in Luigi 
Condorelli, Anne-Marie La Rosa and Sylvie Scherrer (eds), The United Nations and 
International Humanitarian Law, Actes du colloque international à l’occasion du 
cinquantième anniversaire de l’ONU (Pédone, Geneva 1995) 
ENGDAHL O, ‘The legal status of United Nations and associated personnel in peace operations and 
the legal regime protecting them’ in G L Beruto (ed), International Humanitarian Law, 
Human Rights and Peace Operations: Conference Proceedings, 31st Round Table on Current 
Problems of International Humanitarian Law (San Remo 4–6 September 2008) 
——, ‘Multinational Peace Operations Forces Involved in Armed Conflict: Who are the Parties?’ in 
Kjetil Mujezinović Larsen, Camilla Gundahl Cooper and Gro Nystuen (eds), Searching for a 
“Principle of Humanity” in International Humanitarian Law (First Paperback Edition, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2012) 
FAINARU S, ‘Iraq Contractors Face Growing Parallel War’ WashingtonPost (Washington 16 June 
	 	 79 
2007) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/15/AR20070615026 
02_3.html> accessed 01 December 2016 
FERRARO T, ’The applicability and application of international humanitarian law to multinational 
forces’ (2013) 95 Int’lRRC 561 
FINDLAY T, The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002)  
FRANCIS D J, ‘Mercenary Intervention in Sierra Leone: Providing National Security or International 
Exploitation?’ (1999) 2 TWQ 319 
GENSER J and GARVIE C, ‘Contracting for Stability: The Potential Use of Private Military 
Contractors as a United Nations Rapid-Reaction Force’ (2016) 16 CJInt’lL 439 
GHAZI J M, ‘The Legal Status of Employees of Private Military/ Security Companies Participating 
in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations’ (2015) 13 NwJInt’lHR 
GILLARD E-C, ‘Business Goes to War: Private Military/Security Companies and International 
Humanitarian Law’ (2006) Int’lRRC  
GÓMEZ DEL PRADO J L., ‘A United Nations Instrument to Regulate and Monitor Private Military 
and Security Contractors’ (2011) 1 Notre-DameJInt’l&CL 1 
GREENWOOD C, ‘International Humanitarian Law and United Nations Military Operations’ (1998) 3 
YbKInt’lHL 3 
GRENFELL K, ‘Perspective on the applicability and application of international humanitarian law: 
the UN context’ (2013) 95 Int’lRRC 645 
HATTO R, ‘From peacekeeping to peacebuilding: the evolution of the role of the United Nations in 
peace operations’ (2013) 95 Int’lRRC 495 
HENCKAERTS J-M AND DOSWALD-BECK L, Customary International Humanitarian Law: Volume 1, 
Rules (ICRC and CambUP, Cambridge 2005) 
HOWE H, ‘Private Security Forces and African Stability: The Case of Executive Outcomes’ (1998) 
34 JMAS 307 
IPSEN K, ‘Combatants and non-Combatants’, in D. Fleck (ed), The Handbook of International 
Humanitarian Law (Third Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013)  
KALDOR M, ‘In Defence of New Wars’ (2013) 2(1) SInt’lJSD 1 
KELLENBERGER J, ‘Keynote address’ in G L Beruto (ed), International Humanitarian Law, Human 
Rights and Peace Operations: Conference Proceedings, 31st Round Table on Current 
Problems of International Humanitarian Law (San Remo 4–6 September 2008) 
LADSOUS H, (Head of the Department of PKO) ‘Scale of United Nations Peacekeeping across 
Massive Distances in Midst of Conflict Matched by Operational Complexity, Department 
Head Tells Fourth Committee’ (28 October 2014) Press Release GA/SPD/567  
LAWYER J F, ’Military Effectiveness and Economic Efficiency in Peacekeeping: Public versus 
Private’ (2005) 33 ODS 99 
	 	 80 
LEHNARDT C, ‘Peacekeeping’ in Simon Chesterman and Angelina Fisher (eds), Private security, 
public order: the outsourcing of public services and its limits (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2007) 
LINTI T, ‘Multi-stakeholder self-regulation mechanism for PMSCs – good enough for the United 
Nations?’ <http://voelkerrechtsblog.org/multi-stakeholder-self-regulation-mechanisms-for-
pmscs-good-enough-for-the-united-nations/> accessed 21 November 2016 
LORENZINI F and FRANCIONI F, ‘The Role of Human Rights in the Regulation of Private Military 
and Security Companies’ in Francesco Francioni and Natalino Ronzitti (eds), War by 
Contract: Human Rights, Humanitarian Law, and Private Contractors (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2011) 
MACLEOD SORCHA, ‘The Role of International Regulatory Initiatives on Business and Human 
Rights for Holding Private Military and Security Contractors to Account’ in Francesco 
Francioni and Natalino Ronzitti (eds), War by Contract: Human Rights, Humanitarian Law, 
and Private Contractors (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011) 
MATHIAS S, ‘Regulating and Monitoring Private Military and Security Companies in united Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations’ in Benoît D’Aboville (ed), Private Military and Security 
Companies: 35th Round Table on Current Issues of International Humanitarian Law 
(Sanremo, 6th – 8th September 2012) (FrancoAngeli, Milano 2013)  
MCFATE S, ’Outsourcing the Making of Militaries: DynCorp International as Sovereign Agent’ 
(2008) 36 RevAPE 645 
MC GREAL C, ‘What’s the point of peacekeepers when they don’t keep the peace?’ Guardian (17 
September 2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/17/un-united-nations-
peacekeepers-rwanda-bosnia> accessed 2 December 2016. 
MCIVOR P, ‘Private Peacekeeping – Opportunity or Impossibility?’ (1998) 27 P&Int’lR 3 
MELZER N, ‘Third Expert Meeting on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ (23-25 
October 2005, Geneva) 
MELZER N, ‘Fourth Expert Meeting on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ (27-28 
November 2006) 
MELZER N, Interpretive guidance on the notion of direct participation in hostilities under 
international humanitarian law (International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva 2009) 
MILLER C T, ‘A Colombian Town Caught in a Cross Fire: The Bombing of Santo Domingo Shows 
How Messy U.S. Involvement in the Latin American Drug War Can Be’ LosAngelesTimes 
(Los Angeles 17 March 2002) 
 <http://articles.latimes.com/2002/mar/17/news/mn-33272/9> accessed 29 November 2016 
O’BRIEN K A,‘Military‐advisory groups and African security: Privatized peacekeeping?’ (1998) 5 
Int’lP 78 
O’GRADY S, ‘How a U.N. Drone Crashed in Congo and Was Promptly Forgotten’ ForeignPolicy 
(10 September 2015) <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/10/how-a-u-n-drone-crashed-in-
congo-and-was-promptly-forgotten/> accessed 21 November 2016 
	 	 81 
ØSTENSEN A G, UN Use of Private Military and Security Companies: Practices and Policies (SSR 
Paper 3, DCAF, Geneva 2011)  
PATTERSON M, ‘A Corporate Alternative to United Nations ad hoc Military Deployments’ (2008) 
13 JCSL 215 
PECH K, ‘Executive Outcomes - A corporate conquest’ in Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason (eds), 
Peace, Profit or Plunder? The Privatisation of Security in War-Torn African Societies 
(Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa 1999) 
PERCY S, ‘Regulating the private security industry: a story of regulating the last war’ (2012) 94 
Int’lRRC 941 
PINGEOT L, Dangerous Partnership: Private Military & Security Companies and the UN (Global 
Policy Forum and Rosa Luxembourg Foundation, New York 2012)  
——, Contracting Insecurity: Private military and security companies and the future of the United 
Nations (Global Policy Forum and Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, Bonn 2014) 
QUIRICO O‚ ’The Criminal Responsibility of Private Military and Security Company Personnel 
under International Humanitarian Law’ in Francesco Francioni and Natalino Ronzitti (eds), 
War by Contract: Human Rights, Humanitarian Law, and Private Contractors (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2011) 
ROUSSEAU C, Le Droit Des Conflits Armés (Pedone, Paris 1983)  
RUBIN E, ‘Army of One’s Own’ Harper’s Magazine (February 1997) 
SALZMAN Z, ‘Private Military Contractors and the Taint of a Mercenary Reputation’ (2008) 
NYUJInt'lL&P 
SASSOLI M, ‘International Humanitarian Law and Peace Operations, Scope of Application Ratione 
Materiae’ in G L Beruto (ed), International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights and Peace 
Operations: Conference Proceedings, 31st Round Table on Current Problems of International 
Humanitarian Law (San Remo 4–6 September 2008) 
SCHALLER C, ‘Private Security and Military Companies under International Law of Armed 
Conflict’ in Thomas Jäger and Gerhard Kümmel (eds), Private Military and Security 
Companies: Chances, Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects (VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaft, 
Wiesbaden 2007) 
SCHMITT M N, ‘Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors or 
Civilian Employees’, 5 CJInt’lL (2005)  
SCHNEIKER A, ‘National Regulatory Regimes for PMSCs and their Activities: Benefits and 
Shortcomings’ in Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt (eds), From Mercenaries to Market: 
The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies (Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2007) 
SCHWARTZ M and SWAIN J, ‘Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: 
Background and Analysis’ (CRS Report No 40764) (Washington DC: Congressional 
Research Service, 2011)  
	 	 82 
SEIBEHRT C, Private Military and Security Companies in International Law (Intersentia, Cambridge 
2014) 
SERAFINO N M, ‘The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress’ 
(CRS Report No RL32773) (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009) 
SERAFINO N M, ‘The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress’ 
(CRS Report No RL32773 – Update June 2007) (Washington DC: Congressional Research 
Service, 2007) 
SHEERAN and S CASE S, ‘The Intervention Brigade: Legal Issues for the UN in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo’ (International Peace Institute, New York 2014) 
SHRAGA D, ‘The United Nations as an Actor Bound by International Humanitarian Law’  in Luigi 
Condorelli, Anne-Marie La Rosa and Sylvie Scherrer (eds), The United Nations and 
International Humanitarian Law, Actes du colloque international à l’occasion du 
cinquantième anniversaire de l’ONU (Pédone, Geneva 1995) 
SINGER P W, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca 2003) 
——, ‘Peacekeepers, Inc.’ [2003] PR 59 
——,‘War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and International Law’ 
(2004) 42 ColumJTransnat'lL 521  
SOSSAI M, ‘Status of Private Military and Security Company Personnel in the Law of International 
Armed Conflict’ in Francesco Francioni and Natalino Ronzitti (eds), War by Contract: 
Human Rights, Humanitarian Law, and Private Contractors (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2011) 
SPEARIN C, ‘UN Peacekeeping and the International Private Military and Security Industry’ (2011) 
18 Int’lP 196 
THAKUR R, The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility 
to Protect (5th edn Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009) 
TITTEMORE B D, ‘Belligerents in Blue Helmets: Applying International Humanitarian Law to 
United Nations Peace Operations’ (1997) 33 SJInt’lL 61 
TONKIN H, State Control over Private Military and Security Companies in Armed Conflict 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2011) 
VAUX T and others, Humanitarian Action and Private Security Companies: Opening the Debate  
(International Alert, 2001) 
VICKY A, ‘Cheap Help from Uganda’ LeMondeDiplomatique (Paris May 2012) 
<http://mondediplo.com/2012/05/05uganda> accessed 28 November 2016 
VOGEL C, ‘DRC: Assessing the Performance of MONUSCO’s Force Intervention Brigade’ 
AfricanArguments (14 July 2014) < http://africanarguments.org/2014/07/14/drc-assessing-the-
performance-of-monuscos-force-intervention-brigade-by-christoph-vogel/> accessed 24 
November 2016 
	 	 83 
WEIGELT K and MÄRKER F, ‘Who is Responsible? The Use of PMCs in Armed Conflict and 
International Law’ in Thomas Jäger and Gerhard Kümmel (eds), Private Military and 
Security Companies: Chances, Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects (VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaft, Wiesbaden 2007) 
WHITE N D, ‘Institutional Responsibility for Private Military and Security Companies’ in Francesco 
Francioni and Natalino Ronzitti (eds), War by Contract: Human Rights, Humanitarian Law, 
and Private Contractors (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011) 
WHITTLE D, ‘Peacekeeping in Conflict: The Intervention Brigade, Monusco, and the Application of 
International Humanitarian Law to the United Nations Forces’ (2015) 46 GJIL 837 
WORSNIP P, ‘Ban Ki-moon says U.N. not party to I. Coast conflict’ Reuters (4 April 2011) 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/uk-ivorycoast-un-ban-idUKTRE73364Z20110404> accessed 
23 November 2016. 
ZARATE J C, ‘The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private International Security Companies, 
International Law, and the New World Disorder’ (1998) 34 StanJInt'lL 75 
–, ‘G4S must end its complicity in Israel’s abuse of child prisoners’ Guardian (London 4 June 
2014) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/04/g4s-complicity-israel-abuse-child-
prisoners> accessed 5 December 2016 
–, ‘UNICEF terminates service of security contractor that operates in Israel’ JordanTimes (Amman, 
Jordan 1 March 2016) <http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/unicef-terminates-services-
security-contractor-operates-israel> accessed 5 December 2016 
 
United Nations Documents  
 
United Nations General Assembly 
 
UNGA ‘Summary study of the experience derived from the establishment and operation of the 
Force: Report of the Secretary-General’ (9 October 1958) 13th Session UN Doc A/3943 
UNGA ‘Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peace-Keeping Operations in All Their 
Aspects: U.N. Model Status of Forces Agreement for Peacekeeping Operations, Report of the 
Secretary-General’ (9 October 1990) UN Doc A/45/594 Annex Draft model status-of-forces 
agreement between the United Nations and host country 
UNGA ’Model Agreement Between the United Nations and Member States Contributing Personnel 
and Equipment to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’ (23 May 1991) UN Doc 
A/46/185 
UNGA ‘Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the 
Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations’ (3 January 1992) 55th Session 
UN Doc A/50/60, S/1995/1 
UNGA ‘An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping’ (17 June 
1992) 47th Session UN Doc A/47/277, S/24111 
UNGA ‘Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations’ (21 August 2000) 55th Session 
UN Doc A/55/305  
	 	 84 
UNGA ‘Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated 
Personnel’ (6 January 2006) UN Doc A/Res/60/42 
UNGA ‘Comprehensive management audit of the Department of Safety and Security: Report of the 
Office of Internal Oversight Services’ (26 September 2008) 63rd Session, UN Doc A/63/379 
UNGA ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Sixty-First Session’ (4 
May–5 June and 6 July–7 August 2009) UN Doc A/64/10 
UNGA ‘Safety and Security of United Nations and associated personnel: Report of the Secretary-
General’ (3 September 2010) UN Doc A/65/344 
UNGA ’Report of the International Law Commission’ (26 April–3 June and 4 July–12 August 
2011) UN Doc A/66/10 
UNGA ‘Report of the Secretary-General: Use of Private Security’ (22 October 2012) 67th Session, 
UN Doc A/67/539 
UNGA ‘Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions’ (7 
December 2012) 67th Session, UN Doc A/67/624 
UNGA ‘Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations Support to Non-United Nations 
Security Forces’ (5 March 2013) UN Doc A/67/775, S/2013/110  
UNGA ‘Report of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human 
rights and impeding the right of peoples to self-determination’ (20 August 2013) UN Doc 
A/68/339 
UNGA ’Report of the International Law Commission’ (3 May–4 June and 5 July–6 August 2014) 
UN Doc A/59/10 
UNGA ‘Report of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human 
rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination’ (21 August 
2014) 69th Session, UN Doc A/69/338 
UNGA ‘Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths 
for peace: politics, partnership and people’ (17 June 2015) 70th Session UN Doc A/70/95, 
S/2015/446 
United Nations Security Council 
 
UNSC ‘Note by the President of the Security Council’ (31 January 1992) UN Doc S/23500 
UNSC ‘Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and 
Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (16 October 2002) UN Doc 
S/2002/1146 
UNSC ‘Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea’ (18 July 2011) UN Doc 
S/2011/433 
UNSC ‘Special Report of the Secretary-General on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the 
Great Lakes Region’ (27 February 2013) UN Doc S/2013/119 
	 	 85 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
UNSC Res 169 (24 November 1961) UN Doc S/RES/169 
UNSC Res 770 (13 August 1992) UN Doc S/RES/770 
UNSC Res 1246 (11 June 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1246 
UNSC Res 1270 (22 October 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1270 
UNSC Res 1279 (30 November 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1279 
UNSC Res 1493 (28 July 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1493 
UNSC Res 1565 (1 October 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1565 
UNSC Res 1711 (29 September 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1711 
UNSC Res 1925 (27 May 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1925 
UNSC Res 2098 (28 March 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2098 
 
Other UN Documents 
 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Human Rights Resolution 2005/2: The Use of Mercenaries As a 
Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-
determination (7 April 2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2005/2 
UN Department of Public Information, ‘UN Peacekeeping Operation Factsheet’ (31 October 2015) 
UN Doc DPI/1634/Rev.174 
 <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/archive/2015/bnote1015.pdf> accessed 2 December 
2016 
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UN Department of Field Support, ‘United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines’ (2008) 
UNDPKO, ‘Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations’ (31 August 2016) 
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2016/aug16_2.pdf> accessed 20 November 
2016 
UNDPKO, ’Sierra Leone – UNAMSIL – Facts and Figures’ 
 <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/facts.html> accessed 21 
November 2016 
UN Department of Safety and Security, Guidelines on the Use of Armed Security Services from 
Private Security Companies (2012) 
UN Department of Safety and Security, Security Policy Manual (2012) 
UN Field Security Handbook (2006)  
UN Human Rights Committee ‘General Comment no 31[80]: The Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant’ (26 May 2004) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add13 
	 	 86 
UN Human Rights Council ‘Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a means of 
violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-
determination’ (9 January 2008) UN Doc A/HRC/7/7 
UN Human Rights Council, ‘Mandate of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means 
of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-
determination’ (28 March 2008) UN Doc A/HRC/Res/7/21 
UN Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq ‘Report of the 
Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq’ (20 October 2003) 
UN News Centre, ‘UN to Strengthen Peacekeeping Efforts amid Rising Demand, Says Ban’ (UN 
News Centre, 7 July 2009) 
 <www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=31383&Cr=Secretary-
general&Cr1=peacekeeping> accessed 12 November 2016 
UN Office for Project Services ‘2008 Annual Statistical Report on United Nations Procurement’ 
(July 2009)   
UNOPS ‘2009 Annual Statistical Report on United Nations Procurement’ (July 2010)  
UNOPS ‘2010 Annual Statistical Report on United Nations Procurement’ (July 2011)  
UNOPS ‘2011 Annual Statistical Report on United Nations Procurement’ (July 2012) 
UNOPS, ‘2013 Annual Statistical Report on United Nations Procurement’ (July 2013)  
UNOPS, ‘2014 Annual Statistical Report on United Nations Procurement’ (October 2015) 
UNOPS, ‘2015 Annual Statistical Report on United Nations Procurement’ (June 2016) 
UN Office Of The High Commissioner for Human Rights, International Legal Protection of 
Human Rights in Armed Conflict (United Nations Publications, New York 2011) 
UN Procurement Division, ‘UN Secretariat Registered Vendors’ 
 <https://www.un.org/Depts/ptd/un-secretariat-registered-vendors> accessed 4 December 2016 
UN Procurement Division, ‘Pre-requisites for Eligibility’ 
 <https://www.un.org/Depts/ptd/sites/www.un.org.Depts.ptd/files/files/attachment/page/pdf/pr
erequisite_for_eligibility.pdf> accessed 4 December 2016 
UN Procurement Division, ‘UN Supplier Code of Conduct’ 
 <https://www.un.org/Depts/ptd/sites/www.un.org.Depts.ptd/files/files/attachment/page/2014/
February%202014/conduct_english.pdf> accessed 4 December 2016 
UN Secretary-General, ‘Secretary-General Reflects on “Intervention” in Thirty-Fifth Annual 
Ditchley Foundation Lecture’ (26 June 1998) UN Doc SG/SM/6613/Rev1 
UN Secretary-General, ‘Secretary-General’s Bulletin: Observance by United Nations forces of 
international humanitarian law’ (6 August 1999) UN Doc ST/SGB/1999/13 
UN Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) ’UN General Conditions of Contract: Contract for the Provision 
of Services’ (Revision April 2012) 
	 	 87 
Status of Forces Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of the Republic of 
South Sudan concerning the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) No 48873 (entered 
into force on 8 August 2011) 
 
Websites 
 
G4S Website 
 <http://www.g4sriskconsulting.com/en/What%20we%20do/Services/Specialist%20Training
%20and%20Capacity%20Building/Security%20Sector%20Reform%20SSR%20and%20Capa
city%20Building%20Programmes/> accessed 12 December 2016 
ICoCA, ‘Certification’ <https://www.icoca.ch/en/certification> accessed 23 November 2016 
International Code of Conduct Association, mandate <http://www.icoca.ch/en/mandate> accessed 8 
December 2016 
 
ICRC, ‘The ICRC to Expand Contacts with Private Military and Security Companies’ (8 April 
2004) <https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/63he58.htm> accessed 12 
November 2016 
IPOA, ‘Supporting the MONUC Mandate with Private Services in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo’ (IPOA Concept Paper) (January 2003) < http://www.hoosier84.com/030201ipoa-
drc.pdf> accessed 24 November 2016 
Leonardo website, ‘Selex ES fornirà all’ONU sorveglianza aerea basata su un sistema senza pilota 
per missioni di peace keeping’ (11 September 2013) <http://www.leonardocompany.com/-
/un-falco> accessed 22 November 2016 
MONUSCO Background’ 
 <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/background.shtml> accessed 11 
November 2016 
‘ONUC Background’ <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onucB.htm> accessed 11 
November 2016 
Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA, ‘Participating States of the Montreux 
Document’ <https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/foreign-policy/international-
law/international-humanitarian-law/private-military-security-companies/participating-
states.html> accessed 8 December 2016 
Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA, ‘Private security companies: the International 
Code of Conduct takes an operational dimension’ (19 September 2009) Press Release 
<https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-50311.html> 
accessed 8 December 2016 
Other Documents 
International Committee of the Red Cross ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of 
Contemporary Armed Conflicts’ (Report of the 31st International Conference of the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent, Geneva, October 2011) 
ICoCA ‘Articles of Association’ 
	 	 88 
 
The Montreux Document on Pertinent International Obligations and Good Practices for States 
related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict (17 
September 2008)  
UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation’ (HC 
577, 2002)  
UK Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, ‘Private Military Companies’ (HC 922, 2002) Minutes of 
Evidence, Appendix 6 
US Committee on Appropriations, ‘Departments of commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and 
related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 2005’ (15 September 2004) 108-344 (Report) 
US Committee on Armed Services, ‘Inquiry into the Role and Oversight of Private Security 
Contractors in Afghanistan’ US Senate (28 September 2010) 
US Department of the Army, ‘Contractors on the Battlefield’ (3 January 2003) FM 3–100:21, 100–
21 
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (9 November 2010) 
International Code of Conduct Association, ‘Articles of Association’ 
Coalition Provisional Order 17, Section 4 (3)<http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations 
/20040627_CPAORD_17_Status_of_Coalition__Rev__with_Annex_A.pdf> accessed 2 
December 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
